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Abstract 
South Africa has seen an increase in the number of cooperatives (co-ops) registered since 2005, 
following the new policy aimed at the promotion of cooperative enterprises. Newly registered 
co-ops received over R5.28 billion in direct financial support, comprising a combination of 
grants and loans from government. Over and above the financial support, co-ops also receive 
non-financial support in the form of capacity development. Some of the co-ops received support 
in the form of inputs and farming equipment. In spite of the support that government provides 
to emerging co-ops, the majority remain vulnerable and weak. This study seeks to establish the 
factors that determine the performance of emerging agricultural cooperatives in South Africa. 
In order to attain this, data were obtained from the Cooperative Data Analysis System (CODAS) 
of the Department of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries. Cooperatives considered for the study 
have been in operation for at least five years by 2017. Results of the Spearman’s correlation 
used to analyse the results indicate that membership, wages, training and number of years in 
operation have a significant impact on the dependent variable, turnover. The main limitation of 
the study is the use of turnover alone as a measure of performance, due to limited data. Other 
variables such as growth in membership could be used as additional measures of performance; 
however, the numbers per cooperative in the study are constant throughout the observations.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background  
Agriculture is one of the main primary activities in the rural areas of South Africa where 
unemployment, poverty and inequality are highest, compared to urban areas (Von Fintel & 
Pienaar, 2016). The National Planning Commission1 (NPC) acknowledges the critical 
importance of the agricultural sector, through its inherent ability to absorb excess unskilled 
labour and by providing economic opportunities to the rural poor. The agriculture sector in 
South Africa is widely recognised for its dual nature, comprising a well-integrated and highly 
capitalised large-scale commercial sector (Pienaar & Traub, 2015). There is also a less 
developed and resource-constrained smallholder sector comprising mainly black producers. 
Smallholder producers are poor and less educated, and mainly concentrated in the rural parts of 
the country (Thamaga-Chitja & Morojele, 2014). To a considerable extent, they were 
deliberately overlooked by policy makers and excluded from substantial incentives received by 
their commercial counterparts. Evidence of lack of support of smallholder producers remains, 
as unveiled by the underdeveloped infrastructure, poor access to finance, information and 
established commercial markets, all which hinder their business prospects.  
Success enjoyed by the commercial farming sector in South Africa, according to Greyling, Vink 
and Mabaya (2013), dates as far back as the 1950s and 1960, when the government committed 
large resources to create white farming communities. At the height of financial and economic 
sanctions imposed by the international community in protest to South Africa’s segregation 
policies, the country adopted inward-looking policies based on protectionism and import 
replacement (Gossel & Biekpe, 2013). Government support to the commercial farming sector 
intensified and farmers enjoyed direct price support in the form of: (a) tariffs, which by nature 
aim to insulate local industries from foreign competition through taxes levied on foreign goods 
to make imports more expensive compared to similar local products; (b) subsidies extended to 
producers for inputs and products, equally had a price-distorting impact and provided farmers 
with artificial competitive edge on price. In addition to various direct price support mechanisms, 
government also provided support in the form of infrastructure, tax concessions, drought relief, 
research and development as well as extension services (Ortmann & King, 2007).  
                                                 
1 Commission set up by government of South Africa tasked with responsibility to draft a national road map for 
the stimulation of the economy through intensive support of identified high growth sectors.      
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Development of the commercial farming sector was strengthened by legislation, such as: (a) 
the Native Land Act of 1913 (Act no. 27 of 1913 ) and Native Trust Land of 1936 (Act no. 18 
of 1936) which dispossessed black people of land and resettled them in the reserves of the 
country, while the rest of the land was reserved for the white population; (b) the Land Bank Act 
of 1920 (Act no. 18 of 1920) and Land Bank Act of 1942 (Act no. 13 of 1942) established the 
Land and Agricultural Bank, whose main aim was to offer commercial farmers and 
cooperatives loans at concessionary rates; (c) Cooperatives Societies Act of 1922 (Act no.28 of 
1922) and Cooperatives Societies Act of 1939 (Act no. 29 of 1939) made it possible for farmers 
to secure input supply and market their products; (d) the Marketing Act of 1937 (Act no. 26 of 
1937) and the Marketing Act of 1968 (Act no. 59 of 1968) established various marketing 
schemes under which almost a third of agricultural products were marketed, as well as control 
boards who administered the schemes (World Bank, 1990). Producers were obliged to market 
their products through the schemes at fixed prices. The Surplus Removal Scheme, for example, 
guaranteed prices for certain commodities. Under the scheme, when prices of a commodity in 
question dropped below a certain minimum level, government intervened to compensate 
farmers (Ortmann & King, 2007; SAHO, 2017; dti, 2012; World Bank, 1994).  
Cooperatives (co-ops) in particular served as crucial conduits in driving government policy for 
the successful development of white farming communities (Ortmann & King, 2007).  Co-ops 
drove government strategy of food self-sufficiency and maintaining income levels of white 
commercial farmers. Agricultural co-ops were specifically chosen as recipients of substantial 
support from government. According to the dti (2012), the co-ops turned into successful 
business ventures that transformed the farming sector as envisaged by government. They 
supported farmers by providing crucial services such as access to finance, supply of farming 
inputs, transportation, marketing and processing.  
During the mid- to late 1990s, following the introduction of democratic rule, South Africa re-
entered the international economy. In a comparable manner to other African countries removing 
barriers to promote free trade nationally and internationally in the face of liberalization during 
the 1980s and 1990, the South African agricultural sector underwent major structural reforms 
which included deregulation of the marketing of agricultural products boards, abolition of 
related tax concessions to farmers, land reform and trade policy reforms (OECD, 2015).  
The effects of segregation policies under apartheid remain marked and are characteristic of the 
South African economy. The economy is characterized by high levels of unemployment, 
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accompanied by endemic household poverty and inequality. During the first quarter of 2016, 
the unemployment rate was recorded at 26.7 percent of the total population (Stats SA, 2016). 
Unemployment is structural, mainly a result of policies through which the majority of the black 
population was deliberately excluded from participating in the mainstream economy. The 
quality of education received was of such a poor standard that even the jobs created, especially 
by the private sector, did not usually find the matching skills. To exacerbate the problem, 
government in its plans did not take into consideration the abundance of low-skilled people in 
the country. Instead, it invested in capital-intensive import substitution growth strategies in an 
effort to industrialize the economy (World Bank, 1994). The World Bank (WB) further 
indicated that labour-intensive sectors such as agriculture became highly mechanized, ensuring 
that the majority of unskilled workers did not have any prospects of ever finding employment. 
The country missed an opportunity to capitalize on labour-intensive industries where its 
comparative advantage lies.  
The interests of the new democratic government lie in increasing the number of competitive 
emerging agricultural enterprises that participate in the mainstream economy and create 
employment, while reducing poverty and inequality. The creation of an environment where 
smallholder producers thrive alongside big commercial farmers is important to government.  
The smallholder producers are tasked with improving the livelihoods of at least 370 000 people 
living in rural areas (National Planning Commission, 2011). Co-ops are recognized as a viable 
option to effectively mobilize farmers to form groups and pool resources to become more 
effective in agricultural production (Yamusa & Adefila, 2014). It is cheaper and easier to 
provide farmers with modern farm technologies when they are organized into co-ops (Tadesse, 
2002, cited in Nugusse, Van Huylenbroeck and Buysse, 2013).  
Support for emerging cooperative enterprises emanates from the highest level in government 
and has been consistent throughout the years. At the Presidential Growth and Development 
Summit held in July 2003, the then President, Thabo Mbeki, used the platform to affirm the 
role of cooperative enterprises in rural development and eradicating poverty. Former President 
Zuma specifically elevated this role in his Nine Point Plan in the State of the Nation Address 
(SONA) in 2015. The motivation behind supporting emerging agricultural co-ops is 
commitment by government to improve the rural livelihoods through commercialization of 
smallholder producers.  
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The government strategy now leans more towards support of smallholder producers, to 
mobilize them into cooperative enterprises. A new cooperative policy aimed at the promotion 
of cooperative enterprises was developed in 2004. Subsequently, a new Cooperatives Societies 
Act (Act no. 14 of 2005), based on international principles and values of cooperatives, was 
enacted in 2005, replacing the Cooperatives Societies Act (Act no. 96 of 1981), which 
government regarded as unsuitable to support emerging co-ops. The Act leaned more towards 
support of large-scale commercial agricultural co-ops (DTI, 2009). Both the new policy and 
Act place preference on the support and promotion of emerging co-ops. Furthermore, the 
mandate for the development and promotion of co-ops was moved from the Department of 
Agriculture (DoA), now known as the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF) to the Department of Trade and Industry (dti) to ensure that cooperatives in all 
economic and other sectors of the economy were recognized and allowed to flourish (dti, 2012). 
Thus far, government provides cooperatives with policy support as well as financial and non-
financial support in the form of grant funding and skills development.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The records of the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) show a dramatic 
increase in the number of co-ops registered between 1995 through to 2012. The number of 
registered co-ops increased from the 1 444 registered in 17 years between 1922 and 1994 to 
3 362 in nine years between 1995 and 2004 and 12 188 between 2005 and 2007 (dti, 2012). By 
2012, an estimated total of 16 694 had been registered by the CPIC, with agricultural co-ops 
comprising the bulk of those registered between 2006 and 2015. Post 1995, newly registered 
co-ops received over R5.28 billion in direct financial support, consisting of a combination of 
grants and loans from government (dti, 2009). Financial support provided covered 90 percent 
of start-up costs, not exceeding R300 000 per co-op. Other schemes following more stringent 
criteria for funding requirements above R300 000 are available. Over and above the financial 
support, co-ops also receive non-financial support in the form of capacity development. Some 
of the co-ops received support in the form of inputs and farming equipment which includes 
tractors.  
In spite of the support that government provides to emerging co-ops, the sector in South Africa 
is not as vibrant as in countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia. The majority of emerging co-ops 
remain vulnerable and weak, resulting in them being unable to meet the objective of serving as 
agents of development, especially in rural areas (Thaba & Mbohwa, 2015). The dti (2012) 
alludes to 11 and 89 percent survival and mortality rates respectively, among co-ops in the food 
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and agriculture sectors. A variety of factors, such as poor management, poor access to finance 
and lack of technical skills attributes to their weakness and vulnerability. The heightened sense 
of individualism among people has also been blamed for the poor performance of emerging co-
ops (dti, 2012). The co-ops have also failed to create employment opportunities as envisaged. 
This failure to meet the objectives of the members works against government strategy of 
uplifting the living standards and eradicating extreme poverty in rural areas. People are already 
taking to the streets in violent protests to express frustration at government for what is regarded 
as a slow pace of economic inclusion as well as poor service delivery. 
Mulaudzi (2017) alludes to the success of traditional community-based savings groups 
(stokvels) in the country and indicates that the stokvels comprise over 820 000 groups, with a 
combined membership of 11.4 million, out of South Africa’s population of 52 million. It is also 
stated that the groups have control of over R44 billion per annum in member savings. This 
points to the different levels of performance experienced by the co-ops in the country. 
1.3 Purpose and significance of the research 
This study seeks to establish the factors that determine performance of emerging agricultural 
cooperatives in South Africa. Scholars such as Machete (1990) previously identified factors 
that contribute to the high failure rate among emerging agricultural co-ops. In this study, only 
those factors deemed to contribute to performance of emerging agricultural co-ops will be 
confirmed. The results of the study will inform the development of policy and strategy aimed 
at institutionalization of smallholder producers into agricultural cooperatives. Furthermore, the 
results will contribute to the strengthening of private-public partnerships in the implementation 
of the AgriBEE Sector Code through agricultural co-ops, more especially the enterprise and 
supplier development elements of the Code. Finally, the study will provide a better 
understanding of emerging agricultural co-ops to ensure sustainable partnerships with the 
private sector participants in efforts to transform the agricultural sector. Empowerment of 
smallholder producers through co-ops has the potential to change existing patterns of rural 
poverty as envisaged by the NPC.  
1.4 Research questions and scope 
The research seeks to investigate and answer the following question: 
 What are the factors that determine performance of emerging agricultural cooperatives in 
South Africa? This will be determined through answering the following questions: 
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o What role do government support factors play in the performance of emerging 
agricultural cooperatives? 
o What is the impact of cooperative structure factors (size of membership, 
membership fee, wages, the number of years in operation and training) on 
performance of emerging agricultural co-ops? 
o How access to loans impact on success of emerging agricultural co-ops?  
1.5 Research assumptions 
This study makes the assumption that the sample obtained from the DAFF database on 
emerging agricultural co-ops is representative of the entire population of emerging co-ops in 
the country of study. As a result, conclusions are generic of the entire population.  
1.6 Justification of the research  
The population in rural areas is scattered over a vast area as opposed to the population in urban 
areas. As a result, the costs of servicing the rural populations tend to be much higher and require 
intensive management efforts (Mellor, 2009). Agriculture is the main economic activity that 
provides employment and income for a majority of the poor, mostly found in rural areas. 
However, the smallholder producers who are regarded as the major catalysts for the 
development and transformation of rural areas are equally scattered and unorganized, also 
allocated in small areas of production. The farmers face a host of challenges to make a 
meaningful impact to development and to function as successful businesses. Co-ops are a viable 
alternative that are inclusive and will cost-effectively allow government, together with its 
agencies to provide a supportive environment to the smallholder producers. Mobilizing 
smallholder producers into co-ops does not automatically provide a solution to a host of 
problems that smallholder producers face. However, there are many benefits to be derived from 
institutionalizing farmers into functional co-op structures. The benefits include reduced costs 
due to collective bargaining for inputs and collective marketing.  
Emerging co-ops in South Africa have not been successful in allowing the farmers to benefit 
from a collective effort. In the context of South Africa, where a thriving agricultural sector is 
critical for the success of smallholders, when co-ops fail and are not able to transform and 
commercialize smallholder producers as anticipated, it translates into policy failure. It is 
therefore critical to investigate the factors that underpin performance of co-ops, especially in 
the absence of recent studies on the subject.  
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1.7 Organization of the study  
The study is organized into five chapters as follows: Chapter 2 provides a review of literature 
on co-op enterprises and establishes the underlying theoretical aspects of co-op enterprises. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology, which entails the strategy carried out in the analysis and 
measurement of factors that determine performance of emerging agricultural co-ops in South 
Africa. In Chapter 4 the results of the models are discussed. Conclusions and recommendations 
of the study and future research are presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a theoretical overview of co-op enterprises, with specific reference to 
agricultural co-ops. The chapter is divided into six sections. In section 2.2, cooperatives’ 
definition, values and principles are discussed; section 2.3 provides an overview of the nature 
of agricultural co-ops; section 2.4 discusses  the importance of agricultural co-ops in rural 
development; section 2.5 discusses the theory of farmer co-ops; investment problems in 
traditional co-ops are discussed in section 2.6; while section 2.7 looks at alternative co-op 
models and section 2.8 is devoted to co-op performance. 
2.2 Definition, values and principles of cooperatives 
2.2.1 The cooperative  
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) is a leading independent non-governmental 
organization set up to promote relations among all types of cooperatives throughout the world. 
The alliance has been in existence since 1895, with affiliations from co-ops in more than 105 
countries around the world (ICA, 2017). From time to time, the organization convenes meetings 
and conferences with members to provide a platform for discussions and exchange of 
information such as statistics, news and research reports. In adopting its statement of identity, 
the Alliance defines a cooperative as “an autonomous association of persons, united voluntarily 
to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly 
owned democratic enterprise” (ICA, 2009). 
The definition by the ICA is widely used in literature. However, some sources define 
cooperatives differently. Hind (1999:31) defines a cooperative as an “institution which is 
formed to provide benefits to its members through a wide range of services provided, contrary 
to other investor-owned firms that were developed to benefit the shareholders and investors 
through dividends and stock appreciation”. In defining a cooperative, Deller, Hoyt and 
Sunaram-Stukel (2009) identify five distinguishing factors that serve as criteria to determine if 
a firm is a cooperative. These are application of the statement of principles, incorporation status, 
self-identification, tax filing status and governance structure. Ogunleye, Oluwafemi, Arowolo 
and Odegbile (2015:40) define a cooperative as a “group of people with common interest, 
organized to promote the social welfare of its members”. On the other hand, Kohls (2002) 
defines cooperative societies as a “legal, practical means by which a group of self-selected, 
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selfish capitalists seek to improve their individual economic positioning in a competitive 
society”. According to the United States Department of Agriculture a co-op is a “user-owned, 
user-controlled business that distributes benefits based on use.” 
The common factor in defining a co-op is the fact that a group of individuals seeks to resolve a 
commonly identified need or problem to their benefit. The definition by Kohls (2002) departs 
from the principles and the nature of co-ops in that co-ops are community-oriented 
organizations that seek to satisfy a range of needs as defined by the membership. Maximizing 
profits may not be the primary motive behind the members banding together to form a co-op. 
It is a common occurrence to find members from diverse backgrounds and diverse sets of 
interests and preferences in the same co-op. The diverse membership means the interests and 
objectives may not always converge. Some of the members may show interest in satisfying 
immediate personal needs related to improving quality of life, while others may be interested 
in building prospects of the co-op as a sustainable economic activity (Philip, 2003). The 
voluntary nature of co-ops allows for diverse objectives and goals among the membership to 
be resolved amicably by allowing members to agree among themselves. Unsatisfied members 
have freedom to exit the co-op. However, failure to advance the common interests of the 
membership leads to the ultimate failure of co-ops.  
Co-ops as autonomous organizations need support in relation to regulatory and administrative 
measures in order to ensure satisfactory service delivery to the members and society at large 
(Yamusa & Adefila, 2014). Beyond support through legislation and recognition through 
registration, government’s role should be limited to facilitation of co-ops by organizing 
training, promotional campaigns, financial audits (Wanyama, Develtere & Pollet, 2009).   
Ortman & King (2007) adds that government should be involved in coordination and funding 
of collective action activities. When co-ops expect to get something from outside forces such 
as government, their performance as businesses is undermined (Nourse, 1992). The DAFF 
encourages the establishment of cooperative enterprises as a strategy towards commercializing 
emerging smallholder producers. In its strategic plan for the period 2012/13 to 2016/17, the 
DAFF targeted the establishment of commodity-based cooperatives throughout the period 2013 
to 2017. This strategic goal puts the DAFF as the key player in the establishment of co-ops in 
the agricultural sector as opposed to co-ops being allowed to mushroom organically at 
grassroots level. However, policy in the country confines the role of government to the creation 
of an environment conducive for development of co-ops (Satgar, 2007).  
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A strong interdependence between the government and co-ops is evident in Ethiopia, with most 
co-op union members seconded from government to bolster capacity within the co-ops. The 
study by Emana (2009) finds cooperative unions to be highly dependent on government support 
to access services such as bank credit as well as foreign currency required to import inputs such 
as fertilizers and pesticides. Further support from government to cooperative unions is in the 
form of collateral offered for purposes of accessing funding from financial institutions. Bibby 
and Shaw (2005) are critical of state-led cooperatives, while Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam 
(2005) recognize the critical role of government and the State in helping in the initial stages of 
cooperative development. Government should exercise caution and avoid exerting control and 
influence over the co-ops and allow them to function and operate as autonomous entities. 
Without interference from government or any outside forces, co-ops can build and maintain 
their autonomy as authentic representatives of the needs of their members. It is for this reason 
that the United Nations (2003) advocates for governments to support co-ops for what they do 
and how well they do it in the face of other business enterprises, as opposed to supporting them 
because they are co-ops.  
2.2.2 Cooperative Values  
Literature mostly defines business organizations in terms of the ownership structure (United 
States Department of Agriculture, 2002). The business structure reflects who owns the firms, 
who owns the legal right of control as well as who is entitled to residual rights. Co-ops all have 
three elements bestowed on the members who are the owners, entrusted with control of the 
enterprise and also benefit from the proceeds of the enterprise.  Separation of ownership and 
the legal rights of control do not exist within co-ops and ownership of all three elements by the 
members constitutes the core value that distinguish co-ops from other forms of business 
organizations. Cooperative values are general norms shared by cooperators, cooperative leaders 
and cooperative staff. It is imperative for values to determine the co-ops’ way of thinking and 
operation (Hoyt, 1996). The ICA portrays co-ops as organizations with core values that ensure 
that they stand on their own with members being equal, depending on and supporting each other 
in order to achieve their goals. High standards of morality and ethics are required of the 
membership in running co-op businesses. Ultimately, co-op values place great emphasis and 
expectation on compassion for those around the co-ops.   
The theories of social cohesion and social capital upon which co-ops are grounded compel them 
to seek a balance between pursuing profit and meeting the needs and interests of members and 
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their communities (Chaddad & Coock, 2004). According to Rogna (2012), meeting social 
objectives like caring for the community can be a difficult and unsustainable task to attain, 
especially from a perspective of struggling emerging co-ops. Rogna further states that the task 
is mostly achieved by default in the normal running of the business such as road maintenance 
which is carried out for collection of produce from members. In contrast to Rogna (2012), the 
Heiveld co-op in Niewoudville, Northern Cape (South Africa), has in its constitution embedded 
that 30 percent of its surplus be invested in projects that benefit the community (Cooperative 
and Policy Alternative Center, 2008). The struggling co-ops may find incorporating social 
responsibility cost as burden which they cannot attain.  
2.2.3 Cooperative principles 
Cooperative principles serve as guidelines against which cooperatives establish their identity 
and put their values into practice (ICA, 2015). The principles position co-ops as business 
enterprises, different from others in the way they go about conducting themselves. The original 
cooperative principles were established by the Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers2. The 
Rochdale Society was among the early successful cooperative enterprises in history, made up 
of a group of 28 weavers who set up their own store. The basis for establishing this co-op was 
to create a means through which the members faced with economic hardships could improve 
their living conditions (Zeuli & Cropp, 2004; Mazzarol, Limnios & Rebound, 2011). Based on 
the lessons learnt from the successes and failures of earlier cooperatives, the Rochdale Society 
established a set of business practices, which became known as the “original” cooperative 
principles. These principles formed the basis on which cooperative enterprises were formed. 
Original Rochdale co-ops are captured in Table 1. 
Table 1: Original Rochdale-principles of co-operatives 
The Rochdale principles 
 Net margins distributed according to patronage 
 Democratic control – one-member/one-vote 
 Limited return on stock 
                                                 
2 A society created in Rochdale, England in 1883 during the first wave of consumer cooperatives   
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 Limitation on the number of shares owned 
 Open membership 
 Trading on a cash basis 
 Membership education in the cooperative way of doing business 
 Political and religious neutrality 
 No unusual risk assumption 
 Goods sold at regular retail prices, with net margins rebated to members, rather than discounted 
retail prices. 
Source: dti (2005) 
 
Co-op principles as originally invented by the Rochdale Society have remained, with slight 
modifications into a set of seven internationally recognize principles as captured in Table 2. 
Three of the original principles have been constant throughout and are still relevant many years 
later as depicted in the definition adopted by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), who define a co-operative as a user-owned and -controlled business from which 
benefits are derived and distributed equitably based on use. The three principles of: (i) user 
owned, (ii) user controlled and (iii) distribution of benefits among members based on patronage 
are regarded as the “only principles necessary in guiding co-ops”, (Zeuli & Cropp, 1980:45). 
Co-ops, according to Staatz (1987), have the freedom to select from among the principles 
without necessarily adopting them all. Both the principles and values of the co-ops are 
prerequisites for successful co-operation. The principles are captured in Table 2 
Table 2: Cooperative principles 
The ten principles 
 Net margins distributed according to patronage 
 Democratic control – one-member/one-vote 
 Limited return on stock 
 Limitation on the number of shares owned 
 Open membership 
 Trading on a cash basis 
 Membership education in the cooperative way of doing business 
 Political and religious neutrality 
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 No unusual risk assumption 
 Goods sold at regular retail prices, with net margins rebated to members, rather than discounted 
retail prices. 
Source: the dti (2005) 
 
2.3 The nature of agricultural cooperatives 
In addition to the definition of a co-op provided previously by the ICA, this study regards an 
agricultural co-op as a business which is established by the farmers by jointly engaging in a 
common economic activity, to enable them “to maximize the benefits” from efforts of a 
collective (DAFF, 2015:2). With agricultural cooperatives, farmers are the owners and the main 
users of the services of the co-op. Joint ownership of the co-op among the producers is separate 
from the ownership of individual farms. The farms are treated as separate business entities from 
the co-op. Farmers democratically govern the co-op, with no single member being able to exert 
influence over other farmers or the firm as a whole (Staatz, 1989). Agricultural co-ops operate 
in the agricultural sector and automatically assume the inherent risks associated with the 
sector’s unique characteristics. The sector is influenced by uncontrollable factors such as 
weather patterns and volatile prices in the commodity markets. Furthermore, production of 
commodities is geographically specific, confined to certain areas based on climatic conditions 
or soils. The assets are also specific to the sector and cannot be diversified to other sectors.  
Agricultural co-ops are a vehicle through which transactions between the producers, suppliers 
and the market can be arranged. Arrangement of transactions through co-ops becomes 
necessary only when it is less costly to arrange a direct exchange through the supermarket or 
the agro-processor (Hansmann, 2006). Theoretically, co-ops arrange transactions through 
integration and expansion of farm activities up- or downstream (Sexton & Iskow, 1988; Cook, 
Chaddad & Ilipoulos, 2004). Vertically integrated agricultural enterprises produce and own raw 
material required in the next stages in the production process (Sexton & Iskow, 1988). In the 
case of agricultural co-ops, vertical integration occurs within the co-op itself where all the 
activities related to transformation of the product are performed. Production takes place away 
from the co-op on the farms, which are separate cost centres where farmers maintain separate 
property rights. The purpose of forward integrating into a co-op is to eliminate the middleman.  
The marketing chain for commodities in agriculture consists of multiple middlemen, each of 
whom claims a margin at every stage of the value chain (Daff, 2012). Middlemen, according to 
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Chigusiwa, Bindu, Muchabaiwa and Mudavanhu (2012), have the power to set market prices. 
Chigusiwa et al. (2012) further indicate that farmers engage the middlemen as buyers of last 
resort when marketing their produce. Cutting out middlemen along the agricultural value chain 
encourages direct interaction between the producers and buyers. It thus enables the producer to 
better understand the needs of the market first hand. When dealing with the middleman, the 
farmer bears a number of risks, which include the price risk. The price agreed upon between 
the producer and the middleman depends on performance of the market on a particular day and 
is therefore not guaranteed (Chigusiwa et al., 2012). To the consumer, the cost of involvement 
of middlemen in the marketing chain of agricultural produce comes in the form of the high price 
of food. Middlemen add to the price agreed with the farmer, a margin to cover costs which 
include the handling and marketing of the produce (Daff, 2012). As the agricultural sector 
modernizes and industrializes, consolidation of farms takes place to allow producers to take full 
control of the entire value chain from production to distribution. The middleman is eliminated 
in the process, thus reducing, among others, the price risk to the farmer and the ultimate price 
paid by the farmer for the produce. 
In the modernization process, the sector moves from traditional labour-based agriculture to 
technology-based agriculture (Kusz, 2014:171). Agriculture is capital intensive by nature. 
Equipment and technologies that enable producers to integrate vertically through the 
agricultural value chain are specialized and specific to the sector. Capital investments in agro-
processing facilities have the potential to reduce production costs and improve productivity. 
Furthermore, farmers can differentiate their produce and increase the possibility to bargain for 
higher prices. The low asset endowment which characterizes smallholder producers, together 
with other impairments, constrains them from accessing external capital. As a result, they are 
not able to meet large capital requirements associated with investments in new technologies 
that allows them to vertically integrate along the agricultural value chain. Investments into agro-
processing facilities have minimum size requirements to meet efficiencies to operate the plant 
(Sexton & Iskow, 1988). These can be met through cooperation among farmers as they are able 
to pool resources and form a critical mass.  
Categories of agricultural cooperatives depend on mainstream activities undertaken by the 
members. The three broad categories identified in literature include the following: 
Marketing cooperatives: They are most common in the agricultural sector (Zeuli & Cropp, 
2004). The farmers supply the co-op with the raw material in the form of the produce which is 
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processed and sold. In turn, the co-op provides a service to the farmers at cost, with profits paid 
back to the owners in proportion to the patronage once the co-op has deducted its costs. 
Processing, in some instances, involves simplified services such as washing, grading and 
packaging of the produce. The processed product is further sold to retailers or end consumers 
with a margin added to generate income that accrues to both the co-op and its owners. Emana 
(2009) asserts that marketing co-ops keep costs low and link different countries through export 
commodity trading. In accordance with Zeuli and Cropp (2004), the low costs are a result of 
free flow of countries such as Italy, Germany and Switzerland that have well-developed 
cooperative movement. Their agricultural marketing co-ops have developed their own brands 
as a means to differentiate their products.  
Farm supply cooperatives: They distribute farm inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and farming 
equipment to the farmers at a low cost. When farm supplies are purchased in bulk, farmers 
bargain with suppliers for lower prices. In some instances, lower production costs are passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices for commodities.  
Service cooperatives: They provide services such as extension, collective transportation, credit 
and artificial insemination to the farmers (Ortmann & King, 2007).  
2.4  The importance of agricultural cooperatives in rural development  
2.4.1 Contribution to food production 
The role played by cooperatives in rural development is similar to the role played by agriculture 
in rural development (Pinto, 2009). Agriculture is the main economic activity that underpins 
the livelihood strategies of the rural poor, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The smallholder 
producers are largely unorganized and face various internal and external constraints that deny 
them access to modern markets. Their contribution to global food production, however, is 
significant. It is estimated that 90 percent of rural households are involved in farming activities 
and supply up to 50 percent of the worlds’ cereal, 60 percent of the world’s meat and 75 percent 
of the world’s dairy products (Herrero et al., 2010, cited in Kremen, Iles & Bacon, 2012). In 
countries such as India, the cooperative sector is the third economic sector and tasked with the 
responsibility to improve rural livelihoods by playing a key role in improving the agriculture 
sector (Kumar, Wankhede & Gena, 2015). Co-ops in India and Iran ensured consolidation of 
small and fragmented holdings to improve agricultural production. 
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2.4.2 Access to markets and income generation  
The main pathway out of rural poverty for the rural poor is through improved productivity, 
profitability and sustainability of smallholder agriculture (Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). The 
co-ops are viable vehicles that allow participation of rural producers to jointly engage in an 
economic activity to access modern markets without incurring the financial burden associated 
with starting a business. Mohammed and Lee (2015) assert that cooperatives promote 
competitive participation of the rural poor in production and marketing activities through 
training provided. Evidence of positive incomes yielded through commercialization of 
smallholder producers into co-ops is seen in Ethiopia on commodities such as coffee and grain 
(Emana, 2009). The existence of co-ops in the coffee market in Ethiopia in accordance with 
Emana improved the profile of smallholder coffee producers through association with well-
known international retailers, thus improving the farmers’ share of the coffee price margin. 
Getnet and Anullo (2012) equally observe success in both the grain and dairy sectors as 
observed in Ethiopia, with a reduction in seasonal fluctuations in maize price and stabilization 
of the local grain markets in favour of co-ops.  
2.4.3 Improved farm incomes 
Improvements in production and productivity in agriculture have positive linkages with other 
non-farming sectors. The agricultural sector links with other sectors through production and 
expenditure. At a primary level, the linkages are up stream through the purchase of farm inputs, 
as well as downstream within firms that use agricultural products as raw material. Efficiency 
gains from production and productivity impact positively on farm revenues as well as job 
opportunities created on and off farms. A study by Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014) finds 
cooperative membership to increase farm incomes by 40 to 46 percent, compared to farms that 
do not cooperate. Income earned from agricultural production activities comprises 70 percent 
of total household income (Kremen et al., 2012). Increased incomes enable households to spend 
on other off-farm activities, which allow money to circulate within the rural economy and 
beyond, thus impacting on the welfare and economic development of society.  
2.4.4 Wide participation of rural communities 
Exclusion of the rural poor from mainstream economic participation can be attributed to the 
common incidences of poverty in rural areas. According to Bello (2005), co-ops promote full 
participation by a majority and also facilitate a more equitable distribution of the benefits. The 
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open and democratic nature of co-ops makes them key institutions that are inclusive to allow 
people to jointly engage in an economic activity. Adefila (2012) indicates that co-ops attract a 
large number of people to engage in agricultural production. This is evidenced in his study 
indicating that 46.6 percent of the co-op membership in Nigeria has an enrolment size ranging 
from 101 to 200 members. The lowest membership numbers in the study in 11 percent of the 
cases ranged from 51 to 100 persons. Bibby and Shaw (2005) also observe the largest individual 
farmer participation in the Milk Vita co-op in Bangladesh, with over 40 000 individual members 
from 390 primary co-ops.  
Co-ops are grounded in theories of social cohesion and social capital (Yamusa & Adefila, 
2014). Farmers join co-ops mainly for economic reasons such as access to markets and 
improved productivity, thus leading to better incomes for their produce. Co-ops therefore have 
to balance between the pursuit for profits and other interests of members. This balance can be 
attained by providing capacity-building initiatives to all those involved in the running of the 
co-ops, including the owners (Bello, 2005). Free information flow is key to allow co-operators 
to communicate on various aspects, including product and market information. Sexton and 
Iskow (1988) assert that the flow of information within the organization is easier than across 
the market. This makes co-ops the best conduit for information sharing among smallholder 
producers.  
Information on product characteristics is more commonly shared among the co-operators than 
across the markets (Shaffer, 1987). Co-ops offer an environment for members to express their 
preferences and advice on products and services. Information shared among the co-operators 
involve various aspects such as the use of appropriate technology, technical advice and 
innovative ideas on how to increase and improve productivity on farms and yields. Appropriate 
technologies take various forms, which include basics such as adopting correct methods of 
fertilizer application and quantities. Depending on the requirements of the markets, information 
sharing allows members to produce according to specifications. Sissay, Verhees and Van Trijp 
(2017) allude to the strong social connections shared members of the cooperative by virtue of 
living in the same villages, which forms the basis for exchange of information and mutual 
communication. In the case of crops, the farmers exchange information with each other to help 
in decisions, which relate to the commodity to produce, when to produce, the quantities as well 
as where they should sell the product.  
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2.4.5 Employment creation and poverty reduction 
Cooperatives play a significant role in creating jobs and thus alleviating poverty among the 
rural poor. In Kenya, approximately 82 074 jobs were created by co-ops and generated 
approximately half a billion Ethiopian Birr (or approximately R450 million) in wages during 
2008. Emana (2009) alludes to the 300 milk rickshaw pullers employment opportunities and 
other 700 jobs created for the dairy processing plants of the Milk Vita co-op in Bangladesh. 
Dondo (2012) also points out the 16.9 percent of the labour force that is absorbed by the co-ops 
in Kenya in 2008 out of a population of 37.9 million and co-op membership of 8.5 million 
people.  
2.5 Theory of farmer cooperatives 
Economists use theory as a tool to study the behaviour of economic agents (Royer, 2014). Royer 
further indicates that theory aims to help understand situations in which decision-makers 
interact. This section reviews economic theories and models that support the basis of this study, 
giving perspective to the existence of co-ops. Theories presented investigate agricultural 
markets and decision-making under prevailing market conditions as well as the rationale that 
supports farmers to band together into co-ops. The theories considered in this study include 
neo-classical theory, theory of imperfect competition, transaction cost economics (TCE) and 
Game Theory. Neo-classical theory analyses behaviour of a profit-maximizing firm under 
conditions of a perfect competitive market. The theory is the basis on which theories of 
imperfect competition are constructed as evidenced in Boland (1981) and Hunt and Morgan 
(1995). Theory of imperfect competition relates to decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty, while game theory explains interaction as well as decision-making within a 
heterogeneous group, with specific attention to decision-making under imperfect market 
conditions.  
2.5.1 Neo-classical theory 
The neo-classical theory is based on assumptions made in relation to behaviour of economic 
agents and the markets. Kirsten, Karaan and Dorward (2009) describe assumptions as important 
scientific tools of enquiry that allow analysts to focus on a single set of issues at a time. The 
underlying assumption of neo-classical economic theory is economic agents comprised of firms 
and households involved in an exchange in a market, where there are no constraints except for 
scarcity of resources (Stefanovic & Mitrov, 2014). Further assumptions in accordance with the 
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theory dictate that it is not necessary to have rules that govern the exchange in the market, as 
economic agents are assumed to be rational and lack the incentive to behave in an opportunistic 
manner. The rewards to the participants in accordance with the theory are always in direct 
proportion to the extra effort employed by agents, irrespective of what is done. As a result, the 
theory does not anticipate conflict among the agents, given that everyone has knowledge of 
what the other is doing in relation to the product that is going to be produced, the quantities of 
the product, the price as well as the time when the product will be produced.  
The firms equally engage in the exchange to obtain monetary outcomes in a form of profits or 
the net present value (NPV) of future profits (Doll & Orazem, 1984). Households, on the other 
hand, are assumed to be interested in maximizing utility or the satisfaction they derive from 
consumption of goods and services. In essence, the theory minimizes competition that exists 
among parties that participate in the market by making assumption of information that is freely 
available and accessible to all. In defining competition, Hornby (2010) indicates that people or 
organizations in competition strive to gain something that not all of them can have. Market 
competition, as described by Berta, Julien and Tricou (2012:7) is rivalry among producers on 
their own, among consumers and among producers and consumers for the exchange gains they 
must share. In neo-classical analysis the firm is regarded as a production function (Figure 1) 
wherein the factors of production such as labour, capital and inputs are automatically 
transformed into a product or service (Hunt & Morgan, 1995). 
 
Figure 1: Input-output relationships in a production function 
When firms have equal access to information, they lack the means to differentiate their products 
from those of other firms. The available technology is common to everyone and no firm has 
competitive advantage over the others. It means that the market is transparent, in such a way 
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that all firms have complete knowledge, nothing can happen without the knowledge of other 
market participants. Therefore, the product produced in this market is homogenous throughout 
the industry. Everyone in the industry will have the same optimum level of output, obtained at 
a unique point where no other combination of the variable input that results in a better yield is 
found (Doll & Orazem). This level of output is depicted as quantity (Q1) and price (P1) in Figure 
1. The implication of the theory in the agricultural sector is that each producer will have full 
knowledge of what other producers are producing, their cost structure under different 
arrangements, profits as well as future intentions (Kirsten et al., 2009). 
Perfect competition further assumes factors of production to be perfectly mobile. In the short 
term, it allows firms to move resources across to other sectors where they deem to operate.  
Theoretically, all the activities depicted in the graphs occur automatically in the market within 
the context of the production function. The agricultural sector, especially at a primary level, 
assumes a perfect competition model (Hill, 2006). The sector is characterized by many 
producers and a few large buyers. Products sold by the farmers are identical and cannot be 
distinguished from each other. In comparison to the total market volume, quantities delivered 
by each farmer are “infinitely small” (Doll & Orazem, 1984:15). 
2.5.2 Imperfect competition  
Agricultural markets operate under conditions of imperfect competition characterized by risk 
and uncertainty. Walker (1959) mentions technical and technological changes among the 
factors that introduce uncertainty to the decision-making and production process. There are a 
few large buyers consisting of wholesalers, retailers and agro-processors who procure the 
produce from the farmers. Some of the buyers own processing facilities and other resources 
such as cold chains that producers do not own. At the centre of the requirements of the buyers 
are quantities and consistency. The buyers further place demands of food quality and safety 
standards on producers. These, to a great extent serve as barriers to entry to the market, 
especially for resource-constrained smallholder producers who are subjected to asymmetrical 
and incomplete information possessed by the buyers. Asymmetric information is a result of one 
party (the supermarket or processor) having more information about the product than the 
producer (Kirsten et al., 2009).  
Under the conditions discussed above, assumptions of perfect competition cease to exist, as the 
market fails to adhere to the ideals of providing the maximum level of output at a zero cost. 
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Producers thus incur costs when facilitating an exchange having to access information which is 
privately held and valuable to those who possess it (Bontems & Fultony, 2005). Information 
therefore is an asset to those in possession of it. Those in possession of information have an 
advantage over those without information. A lack of free and complete information, according 
to Kirsten et al. (2009), leads to risk and uncertainty. Customer needs and preferences for food 
stuff always evolved. Therefore, producers are compelled to divert some of the resources from 
production activities to search for information to bring associated risk and uncertainty to 
acceptable levels. At the same time the producers have to be empowered to be able to produce 
the product in line with what the market requires. Producing the product outside of market 
specification can lead to losses. Special institutional arrangements such as agricultural co-ops 
serve a means to overcome the information problem and reduce the costs of transacting. 
2.5.3 Transaction cost economics 
Transaction costs (TCs) are a subject of New Institutional Economics (NIE) paradigm, which 
supplements traditional neo-classical economics (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Neo-classical 
economics fail to take cognisance of the role of the firm and the entrepreneur in coordinating 
an exchange. The theory attracted criticism from scholars such as Sykuta and Chaddad (2001) 
due to its failure to provide clarity on how production resources are allocated and transformed 
to attain profits. Furthermore, neo-classical theory recognizes the role of an entrepreneur in 
organizing an exchange within a firm, but fails to recognize coordination that occurs externally 
on the open market. The NIE theory provides insights into institutions, explaining what they 
are, how they arise, the purpose they serve and how they have changed over time (Klein, 1999). 
Coordination entails a different combination of resources, skills as well as contractual 
relationships inside and outside of the organization in transforming raw materials into products. 
In some instances, firms get into contractual arrangements to jointly operate a production 
process as demonstrated earlier in the study, where farmers jointly own an agro-processing 
facility through cooperation.  
Transaction costs are costs that are incurred when one enters into exchange. They involve the 
sourcing of information, trading partners, negotiating, product transfer, monitoring and 
enforcing transactions (Randela, Alemu & Groenewald, 2008). Within the organization, 
interaction takes place between the employees and management on various aspects of 
production. Interaction also takes place in the external environment. External partners to the 
organization include suppliers of raw material and other partners who supply services such as 
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transport. To some extent, the interactions with external and internal partners lead the parties 
to enter into institutional arrangements such as contractual relationships as risk-mitigating 
mechanisms. The contracts counter opportunistic behaviour of economic agents and govern 
relations among contracting parties (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002). Enforcing contracts can be a 
costly exercise; however, to some extent, they provide assurance that each party is willing to 
perform their part. High TCs deter resource constrained producers from participating in a 
market as well as agricultural value chains (Makhura, 2001; Verhofstadt & Maertens, 2014). 
The co-op allows for transaction costs to be spread over a large volume based on the number 
of individual members as opposed to the efforts of a single producer.  
2.5.4 Game Theory 
The development of Game Theory is attributed to the work of John von Neumann in a paper 
published in 1928 on the minimax theorem for two-person zero-sum games. A game is defined 
as a form of competitive activity or sport played in accordance with the rules (Soanes, 2002). 
Players follow a set of predetermined rules when they engage in a game in order to achieve the 
objectives they have set for themselves. Staatz (1987) describes a game as a concept that 
involves decision-makers who interact in the presence of conflicting interests. The Game 
Theory is an abstract model of decision-making and not the social reality of decision-making 
itself (Kelly, 2003:3). In accordance with the theory, the players in the games of incomplete 
information know the rules of play. The players have numerous alternative solutions at their 
disposal in making choices when resolving a problem. Choices preferred by specific players 
are unique to themselves and are not known by other players. Since none of the players have 
knowledge of the others’ game plan, none can predict with certainty the outcome of the game. 
The outcomes at the end of the game resemble preferences of a specific player and not of all 
the players in the game (Dillon, 1962).  
The Game Theory model is the extension of individual rational decision-making described in 
the section on neo-classical economics, wherein behaviour of rational decision-makers affects 
others (Hayes, 2003.). There are gains to be made from the actions of individuals competing 
against each other or through a joint collaborative action of players bargaining among 
themselves (Cook et al., 2004). According to Osborne (2000), players engage in strategic, 
extensive or coalition games to address conflicting preferences. Strategic and extensive games, 
according to Osborne (2000), focus on actions of an individual player, while coalition games 
focus on the outcomes of a group of individuals. The strategic game commonly discussed in 
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literature is the prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s dilemma usually uses the analogy of two 
suspects who cooperate and agree not to confess to the crime they committed. This allows them 
to reach a compromise payoff solution. The suspects can also decide to compete against each 
other. Competing against each other yields a less than optimal payoff solution, as both engaged 
in a non-zero-sum game where one’s gain is at another’s expense (Walker, 1959). Uncertainty 
and lack of complete information make it difficult for either of the suspects to know the strategy 
used by the other. Cooperation on the other hand, provides an incentive to free-ride, where one 
of the suspects decides to be dishonest and confess to the crime, hoping that the other party 
does not confess in order to obtain a maximum payoff.  
The Game Theory provides a framework of studying problems that affect agricultural 
production (Dillon, 1962). Strategic games are common in the agricultural sector where in 
producers may individually compete against each other to gain access to output markets. In 
competing against each other, their interests are diverse, with each employing own strategy to 
outperform the other in accessing a particular market. In such a game, the farmer to some degree 
has control over the outcomes, following an evaluation of different strategies at his/her disposal. 
The farmer can enter into a contract with a future buyer of the product, reducing uncertainty by 
eliminating the price risk or sell on the market at a later stage. Following an evaluation of 
different strategies at their disposal, the strategy that is finally employed by the farmer is 
dictated to by the expected payoff.  
The other option available to producers is to enter into coalition games in resolving the 
problems. Coalition games are mostly discussed under collective action theory in literature. 
According to Osborne (2000), coalition games focus on the outcomes achieved by groups of 
individuals together. Coalition games are underpinned by the interests of the players that 
converge. Players group together to form coalitions with the objective of gaining advantage 
from a collective effort as opposed to players as individuals (Hayes, 2003). With coalition 
games, instead of players competing against each other, they intentionally enter into mutual 
discussions and bargain among themselves to overcome diverse interests. This ensures that an 
optimum desirable payoff solution is attained. The decision by farmers to jointly buy into an 
agricultural processing plant is usually motivated by a common interest among the farmers to 
add value to the product in order to obtain high returns. Even though incentives to free-ride are 
always present in a group, Hansmann (1988) asserts that ownership of a firm by patrons reduces 
the incentives for opportunistic behaviour.  
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2.6 Investment problems in traditional cooperatives 
Property rights are instruments by which any society controls and orders human 
interdependence and resolve the question of who gets what (Condon, 1987:14). According to 
Grashuis and Cook (2016), property rights are defined in terms of residual claims and residual 
rights of control. In accounting terms, residual claims generally come from the balance of the 
funds in a business after all other financial obligations have been met. Residual rights of control 
comprise decision-making and control of resources and assets of the organization (Nilsson, 
2001). The principle of user owned and user control in traditional co-ops leads to loosely 
defined property rights. The property rights are collectively allocated to the farmer members 
without taking into consideration the amount of capital an individual invested in the co-op. As 
a result, none of the farmer members have a separate claim that is specific on the ownership of 
any of the assets in the co-op. The NIE literature identifies five institutional problems associated 
with cooperative enterprises: the free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control and influence problems 
(Cook, 2001; Nilsson, 2001; Sykuta & Chaddad, 2001). Control and influence problems are 
associated with control in the enterprise, while the free-rider, portfolio and horizon problems 
are broadly related to investments (Plunkett, 2005).  
Ownership in a form of secure property rights is effective in providing economic agents with 
incentives to create, maintain and improve assets (Chaddad & Cook, 2004). The one-member-
one-vote principle in co-ops gives every member an equal vote in decision-making and control 
of the co-op. In IOFs, decision-making and residual claims are proportional to the equity capital 
invested by each of the owners. The decision of the majority shareholders in the company rules 
and serves as an incentive for minority shareholders to increase their investment in the 
company. In the case of traditional co-ops where collectively owned property rights result in 
collective decision-making, the prospects of raising capital from farmer members are limited. 
A general tendency is for farmers to underinvest in the business (Staatz, 1987). The general 
investment problems of traditional co-ops are as follows: 
2.6.1 Horizon problem  
A horizon problem results from the limited planning horizons of the farmer members and the 
fact that residual rights are not transferable when members withdraw from the co-op (Nilsson, 
2001). Residual claims in a co-op are not linked to the economic life of the underlying asset as 
in the case of IOFs. The members’ residual claims are in line with the level of service they 
receive from the co-op. Benefits to the members from the capital investments made in a co-op 
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are over the time horizon when they are patrons. Patronage refunds cease to accrue to the 
member when membership terminates. The only claim that exiting members may have on the 
co-op is in the value of initial share contribution with nominal interest (Philips, 2003). 
Struggling co-ops, as is the case with most co-ops in South Africa, may find it difficult to pay 
members the initial value invested. As a strategy to minimize the potential losses, co-op 
members exert pressure on management to maximize per unit patronage refunds and minimize 
the net price paid (USDA, 2002; Royer, 2014). Indivisibility of co-op capital, as indicated by 
Philips (2003) is among the reasons most agricultural co-ops in South Africa voted to convert 
to limited liability companies in the late 1990s. The difficulty in raising equity capital as well 
as the horizon problem constrain farmer cooperatives from expansion and acquire new 
technologies in order to penetrate new markets.  
2.6.2 Portfolio problem 
Portfolio problems in cooperatives are a result of unallocated equity capital which is subjected 
to collective decision making (Nilsson, 2009). In the case of co-ops, residual claims are not 
freely tradable on the market due to a lack of secondary markets for the co-op shares. This 
according to the USDA (1994) leads to the adoption of a more risk-averse behaviour by 
participants as “investors” are locked in an investment without any prospects of diversifying 
the risk. Members are thus prevented from adjusting their cooperative asset portfolio to match 
their personal risk preferences because of non-transferability, illiquidity and lack of 
appreciation of cooperative financial instruments (Plunkett, 2005:37). Investors may have to 
assess the opportunity cost of investing in a co-op against other available alternative 
investments.  
Democratic control of co-ops as stated in co-op principles, places limits on voting in relation to 
equity invested in a co-op. Furthermore, the tying of equity ownership to patronage places limits 
on dividend payments in accordance with equity invested in the cooperative (Staatz, 1987). In 
an IOF, investors receive share certificates as proof of ownership, thus giving them residual 
claims on the earnings of the firm for as long as the firm is in existence. Ownership is separate 
from management of the organization in an IOF. The firm’s stock value reflects the market’s 
expectation of the firm’s discounted future earnings stream (Sexton & Iskow, 1993). At a later 
stage, shareholders have an option to sell their shares on the open market and benefit from the 
appreciation in value of the asset. Alternatively, the shareholder can sell shares of a loss-making 
company and further invest where there are prospects of profits. This is not possible in 
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traditional co-ops, as future earnings of the business are tied to the patronage received by the 
members at the time. In a co-op, earnings are essentially only on a short time basis and related 
to the service the member currently receives.  
Emana (2009) finds that cooperative unions in Ethiopia lack the liquidity and financial strength 
to sustain their operations. In most instances, businesses depend on outside capital to finance 
operations and growth. The aftermath of the 2007-8 crisis in financial markets increased the 
focus on risk management within the financial firms (Maingot, Quon & Zéghal, 2012). It 
therefore is difficult for co-ops to access funding from the banks as they follow stringent criteria 
to ensure that they are able to recover the capital, together with the interest. The cooperative 
unions in Ethiopia as asserted earlier in the study, are highly dependent on government support 
to access services such as bank credit, as well as foreign currency required to import inputs 
such as fertilizers and pesticides. On their own, without government support, sustainability of 
co-ops as a form of alternative investment vehicle for the farmers is a cause for concern.  
2.6.3 Free-rider problem 
The free-rider problem emerges when property rights are insecure, untradeable or unassigned 
(Cook, 1995; Menard, 2000). Assets in a co-op are owned collectively by the members, with 
the result that any individual action could result in negative consequences (Nilsson, 2001). In 
traditional co-ops where membership is open, members join and leave the enterprise freely as 
desired. When new members join the co-op, they immediately have access to the assets and 
benefits like all other members who have participated in the accumulation of the assets for 
many years. Essentially, the new members get to enjoy the benefits of an asset for which they 
did not contribute towards its financial investment; this is referred to as free-riding (Nilsson, 
2001). Free-riding is also observed at a later stage in closed membership co-ops when capital 
for expansion is required and membership is opened to new entrants. The opportunity cost to 
older members is an investment in assets whose market value appreciates with time. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that members lean more towards providing the minimum investment possible 
in traditional co-ops.    
External free-rider problem is also a problem in most instances. It arises when non-member 
producers who play in the open market realise that the co-op offers better prices and then decide 
to join the co-op as an afterthought (Cotteril, 1987). Non-members channel the product through 
the co-op when market prices are lower and benefit from higher prices negotiated on behalf of 
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the members. The members are also not immune to similar behaviour, where in some instances 
they opt to sell in the open market when prices are better than those offered by the co-op. 
Vorlaufer, Wollni and Mithöfer (2012) find free-riding to be common among coffee co-ops in 
Kenya.  
2.7 Alternative cooperative models  
Traditional models of cooperative enterprises have been criticized widely, mainly due to their 
inferior ownership structure (Van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006) or “vaguely defined property 
rights” (Sykuta & Chaddad, 2001:5). Classical co-op structures do not cater for the demands 
placed on the producer by the ever-changing food system and customer preferences. The 
modern food system by default directs the sector more towards industrialization. Producers 
have to adhere to the product standards as well as other demands imposed by the buyers. To 
some extent, adoption and application of modern technologies are requisite in meeting the 
product demands posed by the market. As a result, the sector gravitates more towards 
specialization in certain commodities as opposed to the diversified production practices of the 
past. Specialization allows the farmer to respond effectively to the growing needs of the 
consumer. Substantial investments in the form of capital are therefore necessary, in order to 
meet the operational needs as well as penetrate the lucrative and foreign food markets. 
Traditional co-ops are capital constrained as members tend to provide the minimum investment 
possible. Outside capital is also not easy to source under these structures, thus limiting their 
potential to grow. 
Not all co-ops still follow the ICA principles as stipulated (Staatz, 1987). The new co-op 
structures have emerged in response to the challenges that limit incentives of members to invest 
in their own cooperatives. Alternative co-op ownership models allow co-ops to adapt to the 
changing market environment and respond to the customer needs to improve on profit 
prospects. The new structures have introduced innovative capital structures that often include 
external ownership (Van Bekkum & Bijman, 2006). Chaddad and Cook (2004) identify at least 
six different types of new co-op models, including the New Generation Co-ops (NGC), 
Proportional Investment Co-ops, Member-Investor Co-ops, Co-ops with capital-seeking 
entities, Investor-share co-ops and conversion to investor-oriented firm. The main difference 
between the classical forms of ownership models and the new ownership models is the voting 
rights and patronage (Harris, Stefanson & Fulton, 1996). NGCs are the most discussed in 
literature as institutional structures used in collective action to overcome investment problems 
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of traditional co-ops. A comparison between the classical ownership structure of co-ops and the 
New Generation Co-op is captured in Table 3.  
Table 3: Traditional vs New Generation Cooperatives 
Generic problems Traditional Co-op New Generation Co-op 
Portfolio Problem Investment decision is tied to 
patronage. Members often pressure 
co-op boards to structure assets to 
reduce risk. 
Risk is aligned with members’ 
strategic goals, as the risk profile is 
agreed on prior to the formation of the 
co-op. Members can trade shares and 
risk. 
Horizon Problem Lack of liquidity through 
secondary market for shares. 
Stock can be traded to allow entry and 
exit from co-op as desired. 
Free-Rider Problem Individual benefits and property 
rights are poorly aligned. Open 
membership to all persons able to 
use their services and accept 
member responsibilities. 
Investment and optimal levels of 
product flows are determined before 
the firm begins conducting business. 
Closed membership. 
Control Problem Information and external pressure 
from public share trading are 
absent. 
NGCs seek greater property rights and 
alignment of risk via patronage-based 
voting. 
Influence Cost 
Problem 
Influence depends on centralization 
of authority and member 
homogeneity.  
NGCs are centralized and limited to a 
specific purpose. 
Source: Mazzarol, Limnios and Rebound (2011) 
2.8 Cooperative performance 
This study seeks to investigate the factors that determine performance of emerging agricultural 
co-ops in the nine provinces of South Africa. The study is, to a large extent, influenced by the 
high failure rate among emerging cooperatives in South Africa, despite a favourable policy 
environment. The DAFF reports that of the 1788 cooperatives on their database, only 32 percent 
are in operation. Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005) allude to the poor performance of 
cooperatives in Africa, which appears to be the norm. This study will assess performance of the 
co-ops deemed operational on the database of the DAFF.  
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2.8.1 Defining cooperative performance 
Performance is a multi-faceted concept. Literature does not offer a standard definition or its 
standard measurement. The definition of performance in most instances is influenced by the 
area or the person who is defining it (Aminu & Shariff, 2015) or the field of study (Sandberg 
et al., 2002) cited in (Abdullahi, Abububakar, Aliyu & Umar, 2015). Barny (1991); Davidson 
(2004), cited in Eniola and Entebang (2015:239), define performance as “the strategic outcome 
that an organization uses to realize its goals, success or not”. Empirical studies use the words 
performance and success interchangeably as seen in the work by Karami and Rezaei-
Moghaddam (2005). However, Akinruwa, Awolusi and Ibojo (2013) reached a conclusion that 
performance is synonymous to success.  
In defining performance of a cooperative, Mayo (2011), Banaszak (2008), and Hӧhler and Kühl 
(2004) take into consideration the efficiency and effectiveness through which the co-op delivers 
value to the members. Performance in an IOF is measured in terms of the common objective 
shared by the members, which is mostly maximization of profits. Profitability indicators used 
to measure performance and management efficiency in an IOF include return on assets (ROA), 
return on investment (ROI), net profit and earnings per share (EPS). Cooperatives operate 
differently from IOFs and have a broader mandate to accomplish.  In a similar manner to IOFs, 
co-ops have working and operational capital requirements. They employ personnel, have to 
source raw material and supplies and also keep up with repairs and maintenance of the plant. 
Profit is necessary for the co-op to sustain its activities, but is not the only motive behind the 
farmers banding together. The use of financial ratio analysis to evaluate cooperative 
performance omits the value of non-market benefits provided by the cooperative to its members 
and the community (Bond, 2009).  
Performance of an agricultural co-op is associated with its continued ability to achieve the 
objectives set by the members at inception and as they evolve (Sexton & Iskow, 1988). The 
Cooperative Performance Committee stresses the importance of taking into consideration 
financial and non-financial measures when measuring performance of co-ops. Measuring 
performance of a co-op can be a daunting task, as non-financial objectives are not always as 
clear cut as financial objectives such as maximizing shareholder returns. There is a question 
around the standard against which performance should be measured as well as whose viewpoint 
should inform its measurement (Zeuli & Cropp, 2004; Chandeler & Hanks, 1993 cited in 
Onungu & Uzondu, 2015). However, Staatz (1987) indicates that cooperative members are best 
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positioned to articulate what constitutes its goals based on the compromise reached among 
members.  
This study associates performance of an agricultural cooperative with its continued ability to 
achieve the objectives set by the members, such as increased incomes. Therefore, performance 
is measured against the co-op’s ability to satisfy attributes such as (a) member commitment as 
determined by membership contribution, (b) manager attributes as determined by the level of 
education of the manager, (c) longevity depicted by the number of years that the co-op remains 
functional and in business, (d) wages paid, (e) access to finance in a form of loans, (f) training 
opportunities made available to members, (g) access to land, (h) co-operative structure factors 
depicted by the size of the membership as well as government support factors such as access to 
grant funding.  
2.8.2 Empirical overview for performance factors 
There are multi-dimensional aspects and approaches used in assessing performance factors of 
agricultural co-ops. In some studies, performance is assessed at a micro-level, looking at 
individual and organizational variables. According to Azadi, Hosseininia, Zarafshani, Heydari 
and Witlox (2010), this practice neglects the variables that may be important. On the other hand, 
some studies cluster variables into a specific category to provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the impact on performance. Due to the nature of the data available for the study, assessment of 
performance factors takes place at a micro-level. Turnover is the only dependent variable used 
in the measure of performance due to the nature of the data. For instance, the size of the 
membership is fairly constant throughout the years under observation, making it challenging to 
look at an increase in membership as a social measure of performance. 
Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005) used the “determinants of APCs’ performance model” 
to model the determinants of agricultural production cooperatives performance in Iran. 
Independent variables are clustered into social, natural, government support, trust and co-op 
structure factors. Co-op structure factors include manager attributes such as education, while 
government support factors include loan and government aid. Using the manager attributes 
model yields a positive relationship between government support and the effective performance 
of agricultural cooperatives. In line with the findings by Banaszak (2008), the model depicts 
manager qualities and characteristics such as the level of education, job satisfaction and 
knowledge of the principles to positively impact on performance of a co-op. However, social 
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factors, which include solidarity among the members, yield little predictive results on 
performance.  
Banaszak (2008) uses a probit model to study the determinants of successful cooperation in 
agricultural markets among a group of 60 selected producer co-ops or producer groups in 
Poland. The producers aim to organize the joint sale of output produced individually by the 
membership. Using hierarchical regression analysis, the results of this study found a strong 
association between co-op performance and government support factors and co-op structure 
factors. However, the manager qualifications had a weak positive relation with performance.  
The approach followed by Azadi et al. (2010) in the analysis of factors that influence success 
of animal husbandry co-ops (AHC) in Iran aggregates the factor at a macro-level.  Independent 
variables identified in the study include individual, structural, external and marketing factors. 
Individual factors place particular emphasis on demographic attributes of the manager such as 
education and age, while economic factors include costs, income and investments of the 
cooperative. The structural factors assessed in the study include the number of members in a 
co-op and years in operation and facilities, while external factors incorporate variables such as 
the level of development in an area as well as market access. The results of the study found a 
positive relationship between success and personal attributes, especially the expertise and skills 
of the managing director, given the complex nature of co-ops. Structural factors as shown by 
the number of years that the co-op has been in operation are not good predictors of performance.  
There is, however, an indication that some of the external factors such as market access have a 
positive impact on performance, while others yield a negative result.  
The study by Adefila (2012) on the factors influencing the performance of 60 farmer 
cooperative organizations in the Gurara area of Niger State in Nigeria, uses simple statistical 
tools such as percentages, mean, standard deviation, frequencies and inferential statistics. 
Independent variables in the study include income, number of years farming, number of people 
enrolled and assessment of leadership. The results depict a positive relationship between the 
roles of farmers’ co-ops and the variables under investigation, which include income per 
annum, experience in farming, population size, type of agricultural activity and quality of 
leadership as examined by the study.  
Mubirigi, Shukla and Mbeche (2016) undertook a study on the assessment of the factors that 
influence performance, based on 244 cooperatives in Gatsibo district of Rwanda using 
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correlation and regression techniques.  The variables under consideration include government 
support factors such as provision of subsidies, membership structure, training and skills. The 
results of the study found provision of subsidies to be negatively correlated with performance. 
Managerial skills have a strong positive correlation with performance.  
A study by Amene (2017) on the assessment of factors that affect performance of agricultural 
cooperatives in the wheat market identified five broad categories into which exogenous 
performance factors are grouped. The categories of factors used in the analysis included: (i) 
marketing factors comprised of variables such as market information, market access, price, 
linkage, grading and processing; (ii) member value factors such as participation by members, 
awareness, loyalty, satisfaction, experience and decision-making; (iii) infrastructure factors 
include storage facilities, access to telephone services, access to electricity and transportation; 
(iv) financial factors include variables such as equity, recordkeeping, working capital, access 
to loans and credit; and (v) cooperative governance factors such as management skills, 
transparency and accountability, gender and management style. The endogenous factor’s 
predictor manifested variables are growth in sales, marketing cost reduction, bargaining power 
and care for others. Conclusions of the study using the promax rotation method found a 
significantly positive relationship between the dependent variable and all independent 
variables. Among the financial factors, equity capital came out as the most significant, followed 
by access to loans.  
A summary of the results of the studies is attached in Appendix 1. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the methodology used in assessing the factors that determine 
performance of emerging agricultural cooperative enterprises in South Africa. The section is 
divided into five parts as follows: section 3.2 provides in detail the methodology used; the 
research design is discussed in section 3.3; the variable description and measure are discussed 
in section 3.4; while section 3.5 provides data analysis methods and section methodology and 
validity of the study, in section 3.6 provides limitations of the study.  
3.2 Research methodology 
According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015), research methodology is an approach that a researcher 
takes in carrying out their research project. It points out to the reader the philosophical 
assumptions that are the basis for the research as well as how the research was conducted 
(Quinlan, Babin, Carr, Griffin & Zikmund, 2015). Methodology is about understanding the 
entire research process, the context of its social organization, the philosophical assumptions 
made, ethical principles considered as well as the political impact of new knowledge from the 
research (Neuman, 2014). Furthermore, in this methodology, the researcher highlights tools 
that relate to research design, which include the population, sample used in the study, the 
sampling techniques, the data sources, the models considered, approaches to estimation, the 
statistical analysis as well as the limitations of the study. 
3.2.1 Quantitative approach  
This study adopted a quantitative approach. According to Bryman and Bell (2015:537), 
quantitative research places emphasis on quantifying data collection and its subsequent 
analysis. As a strategy used in research, quantitative research is deductivism, and objectivism 
nature incorporates a natural science model of the research process (particularly, one influenced 
by positivism). However, quantitative researchers do not subscribe to all three features at all 
times. Quantitative research also allows one to test objective theories by examining 
relationships between variables (Creswell, 2014). In this case, the researcher wanted to 
determine the impact of co-op structure factors, access to productive resources such as land, 
manager qualities, wages paid as well as location on performance of emerging agricultural co-
ops. What makes this study quantitative is that the research was testing the theory that proposes 
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a relationship between the variables and the quantitative data analysis process as proposed by 
Neuman (2014). The process followed is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2: Steps in the Quantitative Research Process (Neuman, 2014:18) 
 
The focus of a quantitative approach is to gather numeric data or gather data in number format 
(Quinlan et al., 2015). Furthermore, it involves measuring; for each variable there would be a 
score allocated to members in the sample (Punch, 2011:109). Adopting the quantitative 
approach enabled the researcher to obtain data that can be aggregated and summarized by 
statistical analysis and enabled her to generalize the results. However, the quantitative approach 
has its own weaknesses such as its dependence on prior theories which have been developed as 
well as the hypotheses. In this case, the researcher had to do a literature search and was able to 
find the theories and hypothesis related to the study. The researcher used the quantitative 
approach using secondary data captured in number format.  
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3.3 Research design 
According to Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2016), a research design provides the structure 
for the collection of data and subsequent analysis, with the purpose of answering the questions 
posed by the research, also justifying the choice of data sources, methods of collection and 
techniques for analysing the data. The research design is the plan for meeting the objectives of 
the research and providing answers to questions (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). The researcher 
adopted descriptive research designs for this study. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2015), a 
descriptive research design enables researchers to draw logical conclusions related to prevailing 
conditions with regard to the situation or issue at hand, but not about detecting cause-and-effect 
relationships. It does not attempt to determine what causes the phenomenon, but simply 
provides its description (Salkind, 2018). In this case, the patterns and trend of the data were 
determined. Four descriptive research designs were found: observational studies, correlational 
research, survey research and developmental design (Leedy & Ormrod, 2014). The study 
adopted the developmental design.  
The two types of developmental design are the cross-sectional design and the longitudinal 
design. A study that involves cross-sectional designs is conducted only once and provides 
information about a situation at a particular point in time, while the longitudinal study design 
includes repeat measures over time, noting the changes as they occurred on variables in the 
time period observed, panels or cohort groups are included (Cooper & Schindler, 2014). 
Longitudinal design was thus used for this research. In this case, data were obtained for each 
agricultural co-op that would have been in operation for at least have five years by 2017; 
therefore, starting in 2013. This means that some of the co-ops were a year old in 2013, while 
others were much older at the time. The choice of sample is motivated by the strong correlation 
that exists between the age of the business and its success. According to Mahembe (2011), most 
businesses fail within the first three years of business.  
The advantage of using the longitudinal design is that it shows in detail how things developed 
over time, providing the possibility of comparing within the same groups, thus allowing 
continuity between groups that differ, making it possible for modified cause-and-effect 
speculation with regards to the relationship among the variables and also provides high 
comparability of groups (Salkind, 2018). The disadvantage is its expensive nature and its 
potential for a high dropout rate (Salkind, 2018). In this study, data were collected and there 
was no expense in data collection. According to McQueen and Knussen (2013), secondary data 
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are readily available, collected for previous research and not the current research; it can also be 
obtained from secondary sources. In this study, the researcher took 3 375 computer-generated 
observations and when the data were cleaned and outliers removed, there were 1 335 
observations left that were ideal for performing a regression analysis. 
3.3.1 Population and population size 
Neuman (2014) defines a population as the theoretical representation of a group from which 
the researcher obtains a sample to generate generalized results. The target population for the 
study was emerging agricultural co-ops that have been in business for at least five years by 
2017, registered on the Cooperative Data Analysis System (CODAS) of the DAFF. The 
CODAS is a web-based computer application designed to store, collate and analyse data on 
agricultural cooperatives in South Africa. Development of the system was informed by lack of 
a credible information management system for cooperatives in the sector. The system was 
developed with the assistance of the International Cooperative Alliance’s (ICA) office for the 
Africa region, based in Nairobi, Kenya. The DAFF hosts the system on its server and has user 
rights controlled. The data on cooperatives in the sector are gathered by provincial departments 
of agriculture using a pre-determined questionnaire and captured on the system by the DAFF 
and in some instances by provincial staff. Captured data is updated annually to ensure reliability 
and accuracy. Data captured on the system is available to members of the public on request. 
3.3.2 Sample size and population sampling techniques 
Cooper and Schindler (2014) define a sample as carefully selected participants, be it cases or 
records, that represents the target population. In this study as mentioned earlier on, the 
population under investigation was identified as emerging agricultural co-ops registered on the 
CODAS of the DAFF that have been in operation for at least five years by 2017. A sampling 
frame or the working population, according to Quinlan et al. (2015), comprises a representative 
list (quasi-list) of elements of a population from which a sample is drawn. For the sample to be 
representative of the population, it is important for the sampling frame to include all (or nearly 
all) members of the population (Rubin & Babbie, 2016: 410). Sampling follows a process in 
which a few observations (a sample) are selected from a bigger group (the sampling population) 
such that they are a basis for estimation or prediction of the prevalence of unknown piece of 
information, be it a situation or outcome with regard to the bigger group (Kumar 2011:193).  
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The method of selecting a sampling frame may be based on a probability sampling or non-
probability sampling, subject to the type of study (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Probability sampling 
is about selecting a member of the population without the knowledge of the probability of which 
one member will be selected. Probability samples are utilized in the quantitative approach. The 
parameters of interest to the researcher were emerging agricultural co-ops that have been in 
operation for at least five consecutive years from 2013 to 2017. The co-ops must have 
accurately captured information in the business analysis sheet on the variables considered by 
the study for analysis. Co-ops that have not been in operation for at least five consecutive years 
have been excluded from the study, including ‘those that are regarded as dormant’. The final 
sample size for the study was 1 335 co-ops. According to Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson 
(2018), a general rule for the sample size is a minimum ratio of five observations or each 
independent variable; however, between 15 to 20 observations for each independent variable 
are desirable. In this case, our independent variables were nine and thus a sample size of at least 
220 was required.  
3.3.3 Data sources 
The study uses panel data of emerging agricultural co-ops captured on the CODAS of the 
DAFF. The variables studied in this study are discussed in section 3.4. The five-year period, 
which is an additional two years to the critical milestone associated with failure and success of 
a start-up business, was used as criterion in the selection of enterprises that participated in the 
study. All enterprises in the study had been active for at least five consecutive years. The 
assumption for the choice of the sample is that the co-ops which have been in business for at 
least five years have gained experience in running a successful enterprise.  
3.3.4 Estimation approaches and model 
Panel data comprise a group of cross-sectional units observed over time (Hill, Griffiths and 
Lim, 2007). According to Nwakuya and Ijomah (2017), it is a combination of time series and 
cross-sectional data, which means space and time dimensions are involved. Torres-Reyna 
(2007:3) asserts that panel data make it possible for the control of variables that one cannot see 
or measure, such as cultural factors or differences in business practices across companies, or 
variables that change over time but not across entities. Yaffee (2003) defines panel data analysis 
is a method of studying a certain subject within multiple sites, observed periodically over a 
defined time frame. This study was based on panel regression analysis, which is based on panel 
data obtained from the DAFF database. As mentioned earlier, the two dimensions to panel 
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cross-sectional and time series. According to Bala and Prada (2014), a regression model for 
panel data differs from an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression in that the information it 
provides takes into consideration both dimensions over individuals and over time. The general 
panel data model can be written as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘=1
 . 𝛽𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where: 𝑖 =  1, … , 𝑁, 𝑁 is the number of cross-sectional dimension (or individuals). 
𝑡 =  1, … , 𝑇, 𝑇 is the number of time dimension (or period). In this case the individuals 
are co-op enterprises. 
Estimation and inference problems posed by panel models include heteroscedasticity, 
autocorrelation and cross-correlation in cross-sectional units at the same point in time. The error 
components model (ECM) known as the fixed effects model (FEM) and the random effects 
model (REM) were used in resolving these problems. 
According to Bollen and Brand (2010), popularity of these models comes from their ability to 
enable researcher control for all time-invariant, unmeasured (or latent) variables that influence 
the dependent variable, irrespective of whether they are known or not known. The random 
effects model assumes that effect that is peculiar to an individual is a random variable and is 
not correlated to the explanatory variables, while the fixed effects model assumes that the effect 
that is peculiar to an individual is a random variable and it is permitted to be correlated with the 
explanatory variables (Schmidheiny, 2018). 
Hsiao (2003) asserts the greater efficiency of the REM as an advantage relative to the FEM. 
Hsiao further indicates that the random effects model leads to smaller standard errors of 
coefficients and provides a higher statistical power for detection of the effects. As a result, if 
subjects are subjected to a small change or no change across time, an FEM may have problems 
working accurately and a need for within-subject variability in the variables arises if subjects 
are used as their own controls (Allison, 2009). The author further indicates that should there be 
a small variability within subjects, the standard errors from FEMs may be too large to tolerate. 
A test was proposed by Hausman (1978), called the Hausman Test, to distinguish between the 
fixed effects model and the random effect model.  
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3.3.4.1 The fixed effect model 
FEMs are used when analysing the impact of variables over time. According to Nwakuya and 
Ijomah (2017), the estimated coefficients of the FEM are unlikely to be biased as a result of 
omitted time-invariant characteristics such as gender, culture, etc. However, Stock and Watson 
(2007) indicate that changes in the dependent variable are likely to result from influences other 
than the fixed characteristics if the unobserved variables do not change over time. The rationale 
behind the FEM is that all the trials estimate the one value which is the only real value that 
exists for the treatment effect. Torres-Reyna (2007) asserts that the fixed effects explore 
relationship between outcome variables and predictor within an entity (country, person, 
company, etc.) 
According to Torres-Reyna (2007), the assumption when using fixed effects is that within the 
individual, there is something that is likely to impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables. 
As a result, control of the impact is necessary as it forms the rationale for the basis of the 
assumption of the correlation between the entity’s error term and the predictor variables. The 
author further indicates that due to fixed effects’ ability to remove the time-invariant 
characteristics, it becomes possible to assess the net effect on outcome variable by predictors.  
3.3.4.2 Random effects model  
The reasoning behind the REM is the assumption that variation across entities or individual-
specific effect is a random variable, not correlated with predictor variables (Greene, 2008). 
According to Torres-Reyna (2007:26), random effects assume a lack of correlation between an 
entity’s error term with the predictors, thus enabling time variables to play a role as explanatory 
variables. Random effects’ advantage lies in its inherent ability to include the time-invariant 
variables like gender, which differs from the fixed effects where all the time-invariant variables 
are absorbed by the intercept (Nwakuya & Ijomah, 2017). The authors further indicate a lack 
of correlation between the individual’s error term and predictors, thus permitting time invariant 
variables to play a role as explanatory variables.  
3.3.4.3 Hausman Test 
In 1978, Hausman proposed the use of the Hausman Test when two consistent estimators differ 
in efficiency under the null hypothesis as well as under the alternative hypothesis of 
misspecification and divergent results (Pace & LeSage, 2008). The test evaluates the difference 
between two estimators which are consistent when the model is correctly specified, but which 
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differ when the model is incorrectly specified (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). The authors further 
indicate that comparison between two different estimators to consider a test for endogeneity of 
a regressor in a single equation is the basis of the Hausman Test. According to Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005:271), two alternative estimators are the ordinary least squares (OLS) and two 
stage least square (2SLS) estimators where the 2SLS estimator use instruments to control 
possible endogeneity of the regressor. If endogeneity exists, the OLS is inconsistent and the 
two estimators will have different probability limits. In the absence of endogeneity, the two 
estimators have the same probability limit and both estimators are consistent. 
The hypothesis test of the Hausman Test to determine whether to use a FEM are as follows. 
(a) 𝐻0: Preferred model is random effect 
 𝐻1: Preferred model is fixed effect 
   
(b) 𝐻0: Unique errors are not related to regressors 
 𝐻1 Unique errors are related to regressors 
   
If the test is significant, that is, the 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 < 𝛼, the null hypothesis is rejected and a FEM 
is fitted to the data. If the test is not significant, the random effect model is fitted to the data. 
3.3.4.4 Steps taken in fitting the model 
The steps proposed by Torres-Reyna (2007) were used to fit the model. 
Step 1: Hausman Test specification test 
The Hausman Test was conducted to determine if the FEM or a REM can be fitted. In this case, 
the test was very significant and the null hypothesis was rejected since the p-value was less than 
.05, t. Thus a FEM was fitted to the data. 
Step 2: Testing for heteroscedasticity 
The Wald tests for heteroscedasticity was used to determine whether the data had constant 
variance (homoscedasticity) or non-constant variance (heteroscedasticity). The hypothesis to 
be tested are: 
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𝐻0 : 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎2 for all i  
H1: 𝜎𝑖
2 ≠ 𝜎2 for some i 
In this case, the test was significant and the data indicated that there was heteroscedasticity. As 
a result, the robust estimates had to be used.  
Step 3: Testing for autocorrelation 
The test for serial autocorrelation in the data was done using the Woolridge Test. The 
hypotheses for the test are:  
𝐻0 : No first-order autocorrelation 
H1: There is first order autocorrelation 
The test was not significant and therefore there was no serial correlation. 
Step 4: Model specification 
The model proposed by Athanasoglou, Brissimis and Delis (2005:12) was fitted to the data. 
The general model estimated was in the following linear form: 
Π𝒊𝒕 + 𝒄 ∑ 𝜷𝒌
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏
𝑿𝒊𝒕
𝒌 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 
and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 = 𝑣𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑡 
where: Π𝑖𝑡  is the turnover of the co-op  i at time t, with i =1; ....., N; t =1; ...., T. c is a constant 
term, 𝑋𝑖𝑡s are k explanatory variables and 𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the disturbance with 𝑣𝑖  the unobserved 
cooperative-specific effect and µ𝑖𝑡  the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error component 
regression model. Where 𝑣𝑖~ IIN (0. σ 
2
v) and independent of ᴜit ~IIN (0.σ 2u).  
In this case, the actual model to be fitted is as follows: 
𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where: 
Turnoveri,t is Turnover 
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Wagesi,t is Wages 
Membi,t is Membership  
Feei,t is Membership fee 
Operationi,t is years in Operation 
Granti,t is Access to Grants  
Loani,t is. is Access to Loans  
Trainingi,t is Training 
Landi,t is Access to Land  
Quali,t is Manager Qualifications 
Urbani,t is Classification of province according to urban or rural  
𝛽0  is the average value of 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡  when each of the independent 
variables 
 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠
𝑖,𝑡
…… … 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 equals 0.  
𝛽 represents the average change in 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 expected to result from a change in one unit of 
any chosen independent variable, 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡… 𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 with all other variables held constant.  
The subscript i captures an individual co-op and t captures the period under study.  
A correlation matrix is conducted to determine the presence of collinearity among the 
independent variables. Increased levels of correlation among independent regression variables 
result in correlation coefficients becoming less reliable (Kothari, 2004). Furthermore, 
descriptive statistics such as the mean and standard deviation of all the variables will be 
discussed in the subsequent chapter. These figures will confirm and quantify or disquantify the 
differences in the variability of the variables considered. Inferential statistics were conducted 
using independent test and ANOVA to determine the variables that impact on turnover.  
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3.4 The variable description and measurement 
3.4.1 The predictor variable  
Annual turnover 
This study regards annual turnover as a dependent variable and a performance measure for 
emerging agricultural co-ops in the study. Emerging co-ops in South Africa are fairly young 
and characterized by high failure rates. Unlike IOFs that seek to maximize profits, co-ops have 
diverse objectives and profit maximization is not the primary reason for existence. Mellor 
(2009) asserts that performance measures for young co-ops should remain simple before 
moving to more complex measures such as ratios and trends which are reserved for a later stage 
in the development of a co-op. In line with the young SMMEs, co-ops are likely to be deficient 
in accounting and record-keeping skills. In such instances, gross sales, gross expenses or 
operating costs as a percentage of costs are recommended as a measure of profitability and 
performance (Mellor, 2009). In the absence of essential elements in determining profitability 
and efficiency of the business such as information related to costs as well as assets owned by 
the co-ops, annual turnover was considered a suitable measure of performance in the study. 
Turnover is measured in terms of the value of total sales by the co-op or the value of the 
products sold on behalf of the members.  
3.4.2 Explanatory variables 
i. The level of education of the manager 
Entrepreneur attributes such as the level of education form part of co-op structure factors and 
it is assumed that it is used as a dependent variable in the assessment of performance in the 
study by Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005). The level of education of the manager forms 
part of the elements of the manager qualities in a business. Human capital theory takes into 
consideration the skills, knowledge and abilities necessary for an individual to create economic 
value within an organization. The level of education of the manager is measured in accordance 
with the highest formal qualification attained by the manager. A distinction is made according 
to the level of education that managers indicated: basic education, high school education 
(matric), those who did not specify and those who did not receive any formal education. The 
study hypothesizes that the manager with higher qualifications will impact positively on 
performance. A more experienced and better educated manager is assumed to be more inclined 
to understand the benefits and importance of adopting new technologies as they become 
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available and also pursue other strategies that enhance performance of a co-op. However, the 
study only assesses qualifications of a manager, without incorporating experience.  
Numeric values were assigned according to education levels, to distinguish managers with a 
primary education from those with matric and post-matric qualifications. Managers with no 
formal schooling were assigned the numeric value 0; those with primary school education were 
assigned 1; those with high school education were assigned 2, while those with post-matric 
qualifications were assigned 3. 
ii. Size of the cooperative membership  
The most important asset of co-op is its members; they own the co-op, use its services and 
control the overall activities of the co-op (Amene, 2017:413). The co-op membership consists 
of the actual number of individuals who are members in the co-op and they are an essential 
source of equity capital. Firm structure factors such as the size of the membership are assumed 
to be positively correlated to performance of the co-op. A study by Karami and Rezaei-
Moghaddam (2005) and Banaszak (2008) used the size of membership as explanatory variable 
in the assessment of performance factors of co-ops. According to Karami and Rezaei-
Moghaddam (2005), membership of the cooperative must be large enough to serve as a basis 
for building the enterprise. The study assumes that a larger membership in a co-op impacts 
positively on performance, given that the fixed costs are spread over a large volume of 
members. Some of the co-ops in the study have a significantly larger number of members 
compared to the rest and are therefore assumed to be secondary co-ops. One of the key 
assumptions under the large membership is the increased product volumes which are likely to 
result in increased sales.  
iii. Wages paid 
Wages refer to remuneration to all employees within the co-op, including the manager, for the 
work done on an annual basis. The unit of measure for the wages is the South African rand. The 
researcher has not come across empirical studies that used wages as an explanatory variable in 
the study of factors that determine performance of an agricultural co-op. The variable was 
computer generated and the researcher decided to use it in this study for the analysis. The results 
will be compared with those of other studies on performance of an IOF. In line with the 
expectations of the study, a successful co-op is one that is able to employ people and can afford 
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to pay the wages. It is envisaged that the relationship between the co-ops’ ability to pay wages 
and turnover (income) will be positive.  
iv. Access to loans  
Finance is the lifeline of the business, it enables the business to acquire raw materials, capital 
assets and pay wages. The poor growth experience by small businesses is linked to the 
difficultly experienced in accessing finance (Fowowe, 2017). As finance becomes available and 
accessible to the business, productivity improves, growth is experienced and so are employment 
opportunities. This ultimately contributes to development in general. Three groups were 
identified under this variable, two of which are, those who accessed loans and those who did 
not access loans. The members of a specific group did not specify whether they accessed loans 
and, in the final analysis of the data, they were grouped with those who did not access loans. 
This was influenced by the low prospects of access within the emerging agricultural co-op 
sector. Access to loan funding is assumed to impact positively on performance of a co-op. 
v. Access to government grant 
This study regards grant funding as a government support factor to emerging agricultural co-
ops. Access to grants is an explanatory factor in the study, measured in terms of those who 
accessed the grants and those who did not access the grants. There were those who did not 
specify whether they did not have access to grants from government. Government provides 
financial incentives to co-ops in the form of grant funding. The grant support is a crucial source 
of start-up capital for emerging co-ops. Furthermore, grant funding caters for various needs, 
which include infrastructure development and the purchase of production inputs such as 
fertilizers and animal feed. In most instances, government does deposit cash into the account 
of the co-op, but pays invoices to the suppliers on the approved items. The hypothesis of the 
study is that government support factors such as the grant funding improve performance of a 
co-op.  
vi. Membership fees 
Membership fees are the monies paid by the members up front upon joining the co-op. The fees 
serve as a commitment from the member and also as equity capital for the enterprise to acquire 
or finance assets and operations. A co-op where members do not contribute membership fees 
lacks a solid foundation on which a strong membership is formed (Dejene, 2015). The amount 
of the fees paid by the member is usually stipulated in the documents of incorporation of the 
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co-op. In the absence of data that detail the assets owned by the co-ops observed in the study, 
co-ops where members contributed towards the membership fees are assumed to have a better 
equity base than those whose members did not contribute towards payment of the fees. As a 
result, membership fees are hypothesized to have a positive impact on performance of an 
emerging agricultural co-op.  
vii. Training and skills development 
Training and skills development (training) refer to the commitment by the co-op to expose its 
members to training. Through training and skills development, co-operators are empowered to 
understand crucial agricultural and business practices. Training of the members benefits the co-
op when the newly acquired practices are adopted and put into practice. In the study by Dejene 
(2015), participation of the members in technical training is among the structural factors used 
as explanatory variables in performance of a co-op. This study is comprised of co-ops that 
expose members to training and those that do not. It means that co-operators who are exposed 
to training and skills development initiatives have the potential to impact positively on 
performance of the co-op. In accordance with the study, a successful co-op is one where 
members have a technical expertise based on the skills acquired through the training. Prakash 
(2000) lists education and training of staff among the conditions necessary for success of 
cooperatives.  
viii. Access to land  
Land is among the most important factors of production in agricultural production. Access to 
land (land) is a categorical variable, comprised of those who have a title deed or have a bond 
registered over the property, those under a lease agreement, those on tribal or communal land 
and those who did not specify the tenure arrangements. Access to land as a determinant of 
performance indicator is found in the paper by Verhofstadt and Maertens (2014). Different 
systems under which tenure is arranged might have an economic impact on the co-op by either 
encouraging or discouraging investments. The study hypothesizes that access to land positively 
impacts on performance of a co-op. Co-ops were classified according to those who have access 
to land through communal or tribal arrangements, lease agreements and through mortgage. 
Some of the co-ops in the study failed to specify the tenure arrangements.  
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ix. Years in operation 
The number of years that an enterprise has been in business in the study are the actual years 
that the co-op has been in operation. Accumulated years in practice provide an added advantage 
of gained core competencies necessary to improve performance (Mathuva & Kiweu, 2016). In 
measuring years in operation, the actual numerical values which indicate the actual number of 
years that the co-ops have been in business since 2013 to 2017 are used. It is hypothesized that 
the longer the co-op has been in business, the better it will perform, in line with the strong 
correlation mentioned in literature between the age of the business and its success. 
x. Urban-rural location  
Rural or urban classification of co-ops was brought into the study in order to compare the 
performance of co-op based on location of the co-op. Classification of provinces is informed 
by the Stats SA (2001) who established that the Western Cape (WC), Northern Cape (NC), 
Gauteng province (GP) and the Free State (FS) comprise mostly urban dwellers, while the 
Eastern Cape (EC), Limpopo (Lim), KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), North-West (NW) and 
Mpumalanga (MPL) provinces consist mostly of rural dwellers. Provinces which are mostly 
rural such as the EC, Lim and KZN are characterized by high incidences of poverty as opposed 
to mostly urban provinces. They also have the biggest proportion of the population involved in 
agriculture (Stats SA, 2016).  
3.5 Data analysis 
Babbie (2017) describes quantitative data analysis as numerical representation and 
manipulation of observations with the aim of providing a description and explanation to the 
phenomena reflected by the observations. The first step of the analysis of the data was to export 
it into a database. The data were exported into Microsoft Excel 2016. The data were cleaned by 
removing any co-ops with no information. Furthermore, it was cleaned by ensuring that all co-
ops had data for the dependent variable, turnover for five years from 2013 to 2017. The data 
were then exported to SPSS and a missing-value analysis was done to determine which of the 
dependent variables had more than 5 percent missing information as proposed by Hair et al. 
(2018). In this case, the variables with missing data were membership (Memb), number of years 
in operation (Oper) and managers’ qualification (Qual) with 1.1 percent, 10.9 percent and 44.2 
percent missing values respectively. In this case, number of years in operation and managers’ 
qualification had more than 5 percent missing values. Thus, the researcher fitted three models, 
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one with all the independent variables, the other with managers’ qualification missing and the 
other with both managers’ qualification and number of years in operation missing.  
There were also cleaned of outliers. According to Hoaglin and Iglewicz 1986), the best way to 
identify outliers is by calculating 2.2IQR (Interquartile range). Anything lower than Q1-2.2IQR 
was an outlier and anything greater than Q3+ 2.2IQR was an outlier, where Q1 and Q3 were 
the lower and upper quartile, respectively. The values which were outliers were replaced using 
the winsorising method, meaning the researcher replaces on the right with the largest value that 
is not an outlier and on the left with the smallest value that is not an outlier.  
3.5.1 Descriptive statistical analysis 
According to Jackson (2014), descriptive statistics are numerical measures; they base their 
description of a distribution by providing information on the central tendency of the 
distribution, the width of the distribution and the shape of the distribution. Graphical and 
numerical techniques are the two forms of descriptive statistics encountered in literature. Keller 
(2018) indicates that graphical techniques permit data to be present in such a way that it is easy 
for the reader to extract useful information, while numerical techniques summarize data used 
as measures of central tendency or location (mean, median and mode), measures of position or 
standing (deciles, quartiles and percentiles), measures of spread or variability (variance, 
standard deviation and range) and measures of relative standing (coefficient of variation). This 
study presented descriptive statistics for qualitative variables in the form of frequencies and 
proportions while, for descriptive statistics for quantitative variables, the study presented them 
in the form of means, median, standard deviations and coefficient of variation.  
The mean, sometimes called the arithmetic average, is the commonly used measure of central 
tendency, defined as a measure of the average data value for a data set (Davis, Pecar & Santana, 
2014). It is obtained by adding together all the observations and dividing the answer by the total 
number of observations. The median measures central tendency, it is the middle score in a 
distribution when the scores are arranged in ascending order or descending (from lowest to the 
highest or from the highest to the lowest). The mean and the median were used to show the 
value that depicts the value at the centre of the distribution. The mean is affected by outliers or 
numbers that are extreme values. In this case, the median was also used since it is not affected 
by outliers. 
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The standard deviation was measured using variability or dispersion. The standard deviation 
measures variation; the average difference between the scores in the distribution and deviation 
from the mean (Jackson, 2014). When the standard deviation is high, it means that the data are 
more dispersed, while a lower standard deviation indicate that they are closer to each other 
(Babbie, 2017:432). According to Keller (2018:101), the empirical rule states that nearly “68 
percent of all observations fall within one standard deviation of the mean (x ̅±s), approximately 
95 percent of all observations within two standard deviation of the mean (x ̅±2s) and 
approximately 99.7 percent of observations fall within three standard deviations of the mean 
(x ̅±3s).” The coefficient of variation was used to determine variability across continuous 
variables. According to Keller and Gaciu (2015 the coefficient of variation of a set of 
observations is the standard deviation of the observations, divided by their mean, which can be 
expressed as a percentage. Zero coefficient of variation means no variability. A variable with a 
coefficient of variation close to 0 percent is considered to have low variability and is thus more 
consistent. 
3.5.2 Inferential statistical analysis 
Inferential statistics is a body of methods used to conclude on or infer characteristics of 
populations using the sample data as a base for analysis (Keller, 2018). The inferential statistics 
completed were independent t-tests, One-way ANOVA, correlation and panel regression using 
the FEM. The inferential statistics tests were done at the 5 percent level of significance using the 
p-value. The level of significance is probability of rejecting a true hypothesis, i.e. the probability 
of committing a type I error, where type I error is when the null hypothesis is rejected, when in 
actual fact it is true. The p-value of a test is the probability of observing a test statistic at least as 
extreme as the one computed given that the null hypothesis is true (Keller, 2018). A comparison 
was made between the p-value and the level of significance, should the p-value be less than the 
level of significance, the test is described as significant. In this case, a p-value less than .05 would 
lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. A p-value less than .01 would indicate a much higher 
significant test. 
3.5.2.1 Independent t-test 
An independent t-test is a statistical technique which compares the mean score for two groups 
consisting of some interval or ratio scale using a less-than interval classificatory variable 
(Quinlan et al., 2015:363). According to Davis et al. (2014), two populations are regarded as 
independent when measured values of the items observed in both populations do not affect each 
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other. The assumptions of the t-tests are that the observations in any of the samples have to be 
independent, the two populations from which the samples are selected must be normal and their 
variance must be equal (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017). In this case, the co-ops were independent 
from each other and the central limit theorem was used to achieve normality. The central limit 
theorem states that “as the sample size (the number of values in each sample) gets large enough, 
the sampling distribution of the mean is approximately normally distributed; this is true 
regardless of the shape of the distribution of the individual values in the population,” (Levine, 
Szabat & Stephan, 2016: 255). 
The Levene’s test of homogeneity of equality of variance was used to assess whether the 
variances of the two groups are equal. In this study, for instance, the two groups related to 
access to loans in the study are the co-ops that accessed loans and those that did not access 
loans. If the p-value was less than .05, it means the test was significant. Then, statistics under 
equal variances not assumed were discussed and if the test was not significant (p-value more 
than .05), statistics under equal variances assumed were discussed. The hypothesis to be tested 
was:  
H0: The means are equal (µ1 = µ2)  against 
H1: The means differ (µ1≠ µ2) 
 The effect size 
The effect size was used to measure the significance of the relationship. The effect size is 
defined as the proportion of variance in the dependent variable that is accounted for by 
the manipulation of the independent variable (Jackson, 2014). It indicates the amount of 
influence changing the conditions of the independent variable had on dependent scores 
(Heiman, 2015). The effect size, denoted by 𝜂2 (eta-squared), is the effect size for an 
independent t-test defined as: 
𝜂2 =  
𝑡2
𝑡2+(𝑁1+𝑁2−2)
   
where: 
𝑡2= t-value squared; 
𝑁1 = Sample size for first group 
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𝑁2 = Sample size for second group 
Note: The guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988:284-7) for interpreting eta-squared, 𝜂2 are: 
 .01 = small effect 
 .06 = moderate effect 
 .14 = large effect 
3.5.2.2 Analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
Keller (2018) indicates that the technique is derived from the manner in which the calculations 
are performed. In this study, the technique analyses the variance of the data to determine the 
possibility of making the inference of the population means being different. The ANOVA 
procedure seeks to determine which differences exist between two or more population means. 
The name of the technique is based on the way the calculations are performed (Keller, 2018). 
ANOVA is made up of analytic procedure whose basis is comparing two estimates of variance. 
The one estimate derived from the differences among scores within each of the groups is 
considered random or error estimate, the second estimate comes from differences in group 
means and is considered a reflection of group differences or treatment effects plus error 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014:70). Tabachnick and Fidell (2014) indicate that should there be no 
differences between the two estimates of variance, a conclusion can be reached indicating that 
means in all of the group come from the same sampling distribution of means. The authors 
further indicate that the slight differences among the group means result from a random error. 
If there is homogeneity among groups, one would be able to generalize.  
 
The F-test is the ratio of the variance associated with differences among sample means in the 
numerator and the variance associated with errors in the denominator and it is used to determine 
the difference among variances (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). The ANOVA has the same 
assumptions as the independent t-tests. 
The null hypothesis to be tested was: 
Ho: The means are equal  
H1: At least one of the pairs of means is different 
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The Levene’s tests of homogeneity of variance was used to determine equal variances across 
group. In the case where the variances were equal (homogeneity), the F-test was used to 
determine mean differences and in the case where the variances were not equal (heterogeneity), 
a robust test for equality of means called Welch test was used to determine difference in means. 
The Welch robust test of equality of means is an alternative to the traditional analysis of 
variance (ANOVA). It does not assume the means to be equal, as a result it not affected by 
unequal means.  
Additional hypothesis tests done after an ANOVA, the post hoc test (post-tests), determine the 
exact mean difference that are both significant and not significant (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017). 
The post hoc test is dependent on whether the assumption of equal variance was met. Where 
the variances were equal, the Scheffe post hoc test was used as a test and the Games-Howell 
test used in the case of unequal variances. The Scheffe post hoc method computes possible 
contrast that exists between means and the type 1 error is at most α for any of the possible 
combinations, it is therefore a conservative test (Brown, 2005). The Scheffe test is a possible 
post hoc test distinct for being among the fastest of all (with the smallest risk of type I error), it 
evaluates the significance of the difference between any two treatment conditions using the F-
ratio (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017).  
The Games-Howell (GH) procedure is an extension of the Tucky Kramer test. The Games-
Howell method gives the best performance for pairwise comparisons (Shingala & Rajyaguru, 
2015). De Muth (2014) regards Games-Howell as an extension of the Tukey-Kramer test, 
recommended when sample sizes are greater than five. The test, according to De Muth (2014), 
is a pairwise procedure whose basis is the q-distribution and is:  
If the variances are equal, the effects size for ANOVA is computed by the Greek letter eta squared, 
𝜂2 and according to Jackson (2014), eta squared (𝜂2), is given by: 
𝜂2 =
𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
where  𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 is the sum of squares between groups which reflects the differences between 
the means from the various levels of an independent variable and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the sum of squares 
for total which reflects the total differences between all scores in the experiment. Eta squared, 
𝜂2, reflects the proportion of the total differences in the scores that are associated with 
differences between sample means or how much of the variability in the dependent variable is 
attributable to the manipulation of the independent variable (Jackson, 2014:234). 
 53 
 
If the variances were not equal and the Welch F test was used, the effect size was calculated using 
the adjusted omega squared, meaning omega-squared (𝜔2) given by: 
𝜔2 =
𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑡(𝐹 − 1)
𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑡(𝐹 − 1) + 𝑁𝑇
 
where 𝑑𝑓𝑏𝑒𝑡 is the degrees of freedom for factor A, that is, the number of levels of factor A – 
1, 𝐹 is the Welch F test statistic and 𝑁𝑇 is the total number of subjects (Keppel and Wickens, 
2004). 
Note: The guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988) for interpreting eta-squared, 𝜂2 and omega-
squared (𝜔2) are: 
 .01 = small effect 
 .06 = moderate effect 
 .14 = large effect 
3.5.2.3 Confidence interval error bars 
According to Cumming, Fidler and Vaux (2007) the mean of the data, with standard error (SE) 
or confidence interval error bars give an indication of the region where you can expect the mean 
of the whole possible set of results, or the whole population, μ, to lie. The authors indicate that 
the confidence interval error bars show a range of values you can be 95 percent confident 
contains the true mean. The confidence interval error bars were used to show diagrammatically 
which groups differ. Groups that had confidence intervals that overlap showed that they were 
not statistically significant. The more they overlap the more similar they are. 
3.5.2.4 Correlation analysis 
The correlation coefficient (𝑟) was used to measure the extent of the relationship between 
variables. Hair et al. (2018) assert that a correlation coefficient is a coefficient that indicates the 
strength of association between any two metric variables and the value ranges from +1 to -1, 
where +1 indicates a perfect positive relationship, 0 indicates no relationship and -1 indicates a 
negative relationship or reverse relationship (as one variable grows larger, the other variable 
grows smaller. The purpose of the correlation analysis was to determine how the dependent 
variable turnover was related to the independent variables. Cohen (1988) states in the guidelines 
that, if 𝑟 =  .10 − .29 then there is a low effect (low correlation); 𝑟 =  .30 −  .49 has a 
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medium effect (moderate correlation) and 𝑟 =  .50 −  .99 has a large effect (strong 
correlation).  
3.5.2.5  The fixed effect model  
Analysis of the impact of variables that vary over time was conducted using the fixed effects 
model (FE). Panel regression analysis was performed to determine which variables impacted 
on turnover the most. The regression coefficients of the regression analysis are called betas. 
According to Hair et al. (2018), the estimated regression coefficients called betas are 
standardized regression coefficients that allow for a direct comparison between coefficients as 
to their relative explanatory power to the dependent variable. The authors indicated that the 
sign of the coefficient indicates the type of relationship, whether the relationship is positive or 
negative. Furthermore, the authors also indicate that the value of the coefficients show the 
amount of change of the in the dependent variable as the independent variable changes by one 
unit. The hypothesis to be tested was: 
Ho: 𝛽𝑖 = 0  
H1: 𝛽𝑖 ≠ 0 
If the p-value of the beta coefficient was less than .05, it would mean that the null hypothesis 
that the regression coefficient is zero was rejected. It is then correct to say the variable 
contributed significantly to the prediction of the dependent variable, turnover. A negative 
coefficient is a sign that the impact on the dependent variable is negative or it decreases, while 
a positive co-efficient signals an increase or positive impact on the dependent variable. 
The effect size was measured by the coefficient of determination. According to Davis et al. 
(2014), the coefficient of determination (𝑟2) was given by:  
𝑅2 =
𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
 
where  𝑆𝑆𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 is the sum of squares between groups, it reflects the differences between the 
means from the various levels of an independent variable and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the sum of squares for 
total, which reflects the total differences between all scores in the experiment. Coefficient of 
determination, 𝑅2 measures the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
variation in the independent variable (Keller, 2018:120). 
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3.6 Limitations of the study 
This study, like any other of this nature has a few of the challenges briefly discussed below: 
 Due to limitation of information on the CODAs, the study uses turnover as a measure for 
performance of a co-op. Information on costs is unavailable, perhaps a result of poor record 
management associated with SMEs (Ajibade & Khayundi, 2017). Alternative variables that 
could be used to measure performance include the growth in membership. However, in the 
case of the co-ops on the system, membership is constant per co-op throughout the years 
under consideration. 
 The information on the system does not indicate the type of training that the members of 
the co-ops undertook.  
 There are indications that participating co-ops have the tendency to under-report on the 
financial aspects of their business, especially when information is required by government. 
The motivation behind such partial disclosure is the perception that if correct information 
is disclosed, the enterprises might be deprived of further government support as they will 
be assumed to be self-sufficient and reliant. There may be biases in the results based on 
such under-reporting. The study however, considers the information provided by enterprises 
as a true reflection of what is going on in the businesses.  
 Government supports co-ops through contracts to supply the school feeding schemes. Some 
of the co-ops in the study may have had the advantage of having secured such contracts. 
There is evidence of variability as shown by income ranging from R2 000 to R1 000 236. 
Furthermore, the co-ops have not been differentiated into primary and secondary co-ops, 
which can impact on the generalization of the results.  
 Wages as an explanatory variable is not widely used in literature on co-ops, the results will 
be compared to those of an IOF.  
3.7 Conclusion 
This section provided in detail the methods and techniques that were applied in the theoretical 
analysis of panel data obtained from the CODAS of the DAFF on emerging agricultural co-ops 
in South Africa. The section also provided a detailed description of the variables to be 
considered for analysis.  
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CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH FINIDNGS AND ANALYSIS  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the factors that determine the performance of emerging 
agricultural co-ops in South Africa. Annual balanced panel data are used, with all variables 
observed for each time period and cross-section. This study made use of time series data from 
the period 2013 to 2017 and cross-section segment by the agricultural co-ops. There is one main 
research question comprising sub-questions, which the study sought to address. The main 
question of the study is to find out about the factors that determine performance of emerging 
agricultural cooperatives in South Africa, this is followed by the sub-questions that seek to 
determine the role that government support factors play in the performance of emerging 
agricultural cooperatives, followed by the assessment of the impact of the factors of cooperative 
structure on performance of emerging agricultural cooperatives and lastly, to determine whether 
there is a difference in performance between emerging cooperatives located in provinces that 
consist mainly of rural areas and those in the provinces regarded as mostly urban.  
The first section of the results presents the descriptive statistics of the selected variables and 
the correlation analysis to determine how the continuous variables relate to each other and to 
the dependent variable. The third part presents the estimated models, followed by the 
independent tests to determine how variables with two categories impact on performance. This 
is then followed by a one-way analysis of variance to determine how categorical variables with 
more than three categories impact on performance. TURNOVER in rands was used as a 
measure of performance. Since the variables had large values, the dependent variable was 
transformed to natural logarithms. Natural logarithms were also applied to the variable wages 
and membership fee. 
When estimating the model, the Hausman Test was used to determine whether to use the FEM 
or the REM. The results of the test indicated the FEM to be the appropriate model to be fitted 
to the data. Panel data were subsequently diagnosed for the presence of autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. The regression was conducted to quantify the magnitude of the impact of 
the explanatory variables on LNTURNOVER. The model was then fitted to the data for the 
dependent variable using continuous explanatory and categorical variables. Dummy variables 
for the categorical variables, access to grant (GRANT), access to loans (LOAN), Type of 
training (TRAINING) access to land (LAND) and manager’s qualification (QUAL) were 
created as mentioned in the methodology section. 
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Before regression of performance determinants is performed, a test should be conducted to test 
the appropriateness of the panel data across time periods (both time-series and cross-section 
data) based on certain criteria. Descriptive statistics in the form of frequencies, proportions, 
minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation and the coefficient of variations were 
used to determine trends and patterns of the data and will be discussed in the following section. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of variables  
Descriptive statistics must be conducted before any reliability, validation and further analysis 
for collected data are established (Pallent, 2007). 
4.2.1 Characteristics of the categorical variables 
There were 285 emerging cooperative enterprises that participated in the study, each with five-
year data values from 2013 to 2017, making a total of 1425 yearly values. The categorical 
variables for the study included co-ops that received a grant and those that did not; those that 
received loans and those that did not; those whose members received training and those that did 
not; those that farm on communal, leased or mortgaged land; the manager’s qualifications and 
the co-ops distinguished according to rural-urban classification. Table 4 presents characteristics 
of the categorical variables.  
Table 4: Characteristics of the categorical variables 
Variable Category Frequency Percent  
Access to grant No 629 44.1 
 Yes 796 55.9 
 Total 1425 100 
Access to loans None 547 38.4 
 Named 65 4.6 
 Not specified 813 57.1 
 Total 1425 100. 
Received training No 570 40 
 Yes 855 60 
 Total 1425 100 
Access to land  Not specified 1219 85.5 
 Bonded/Title deed 41 2.9 
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Variable Category Frequency Percent  
 Communal/Tribal land 128 9 
 Lease agreement 37 2.6 
 Total 1425 100 
Managers attributes Non-formal training programmes 65 8.1 
 Primary 124 15.4 
 Secondary 57 7.1 
 Tertiary 559 69.4 
 Total 805 100 
Classification of co-op  Rural based 735 51.6 
 Urban based 690 48.4 
 Total 1425 100 
Province Eastern Cape 125 8.8 
 Gauteng 225 15.8 
 Free State 75 5.3 
 KwaZulu-Natal 320 22.5 
 Northern Cape 295 20.7 
 Western Cape 95 6.7 
 Limpopo 160 11.2% 
 North West 130 9.1 
 Total 1425 100 
 
The results of the study indicated that agricultural co-ops that had access to grants were 55.9 
percent (n=796), while 44.1 percent (n=629) did not have access. The ratio of those with access 
to a grant and those without access was thus almost 1:1. However, the co-ops that accessed a 
grant are slightly more by just under 3 percent. According to this study, grant funding is 
regarded as a government support factor. As a result, the results indicated that almost half of 
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the co-ops received support from government. The observation based on the percentage of co-
ops that receive grant funding, suggests that a majority of smallholder farmers are unable or 
reluctant to invest in their farming systems to boost production as observed by Pienaar and 
Traub (2015).  
In 60 percent (n=855) of the co-ops, the members received training, while in 40 percent 
(n=570), the members did not receive training. This indicates that most of the co-ops in the 
study exposed their members to training and skills development. It is not surprising that most 
of the co-ops provide training and skills development to their members. Training is an important 
aspect in the success of the co-op, in some instances it is the attraction behind people joining a 
co-op. Training provides members with an opportunity to acquire knowledge on technical 
aspects of production, such as fertilizer application, diseases and pest management (Mubigiri, 
Shukla & Mbeche, 2016).  
A majority of the co-ops had access to land, but did not specify the nature of tenure 
arrangements, in total 85.5 percent (n=1219). Only 9 percent (n=12) indicated that they farm 
on communal or tribal land. The remainder of the co-ops, either have bond or title deed on the 
land, thus giving ownership of the land at 2.9 percent (n=41) and 2.6 percent for lease 
agreements (n=37). The data are highly skewed towards the co-ops who did not specify the 
nature of tenure arrangements. Perhaps the co-ops that did not specify tenure arrangements are 
those on land purchased under the land reform programme and the option was not provided on 
the business analysis forms used to capture information. 
With access to loans, a total of 95.4 percent (n=547) had no access to loans, while 4.6 percent 
(n=65) had access to loans. Of those who did not have access to loans, about 57.1 percent 
(n=813) are the co-ops who did not specify if they had a loan, but assumed to have not had a 
loan in the study. It can be noted that very few emerging agricultural co-ops tend to access 
loans, in this case only 5 percent. Smallholder farmer-specific characteristics such as lack of 
fixed assets to serve as collateral as well as conditions imposed by financial institutions, serve 
as impediments to accessing finance. Regasa, Fieldieng and Roberts (2017) also found low 
levels of access to external credit by firms in Ethiopia, with only 0.7 and 0.8 percent of working 
and fixed capital respectively, being financed through loans.   
There were 43.5 percent of the co-ops who did not indicate the manager’s qualification. Of 
those who indicated the manager’s qualification, about 69.4 percent (n=559) had a tertiary 
qualification, 7.1 percent (n=57) had a secondary qualification, 15.4 percent (n=124) had a 
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primary qualification, while 8.1 percent (n=65) did not have any formal training. It can be noted 
that most of the people who indicated their qualification had tertiary qualifications.  
With regard to location of the co-ops, about 51.6 percent (n=735) of the co-ops were based in 
a province with a high proportion of rural dwellers (mostly rural), while 48.4 percent (n=690) 
were located in a province with a high proportion of urban dwellers (mostly urban). NC and 
GP, despite being mostly urban provinces, have the second and third highest number of co-ops 
respectively. Proximity to markets as well as the infrastructure could be playing a role in the 
high number of co-ops in the province. 
In accordance with the methodology of this study, an analysis was conducted on the 
performance of emerging agricultural co-ops in the nine provinces of South Africa. After 
cleaning the data, MPL did not have enough co-ops with complete records for the period under 
consideration, from 2013 to 2017. Therefore, this province was excluded from the analysis, 
leaving the study to focus on eight provinces. About 22.5 percent (n=320) were from KZN, 
20.7 percent (n=295) were from NC, 15.8 percent (n=225) were from GP and 11.2 percent 
(n=160) were from Lim. Other co-ops were from the EC, FS, WC and NW with proportions of 
8.8 percent, 5.3 percent, 6.7 percent and 9.1 percent, respectively.  
4.3 Characteristics of the categorical variables 
Descriptive statistics of the continuous variables are shown in Table 5 in the form of the mean, 
median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation and coefficient variation of the data. The 
purpose of these statistics is merely to indicate the centre and the spread of the data used in the 
study, thus giving an idea of what the data looks like. After preparing the data for analysis, 
descriptive statistics were presented.  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 2013-2017 
Summary 
statistics 
Continuous variables 
TURNOVER Membership 
(MEMB) 
WAGES Member fee  
(FEE) 
No. of 
years in 
operation 
(OPER) 
Mean R261 338.74 8.98 R33 056.46 R3 885.68 6.18 
Median R150 000.00 7 R22 000.00 R2 500.00 5.00 
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Summary 
statistics 
Continuous variables 
TURNOVER Membership 
(MEMB) 
WAGES Member fee  
(FEE) 
No. of 
years in 
operation 
(OPER) 
Standard 
deviation 
R284 691.03  5.132 R31 473.992 R3 975.162 3.536 
Minimum R2 000 5 R300 R120 1 
Maximum R1 000 236 21 R110 000 R12 500 16 
Coefficient of 
variation 
91.80% 57.15% 95.21% 102.30% 57.22% 
Skewness 1.484 1.368 1.284 1.171 -.711 
Kurtosis 1.221 .638 .703 .159 .150 
Shapiro Wilk 
Test of normality 
𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 
 
As shown in Table 5, performance of cooperatives was measured by the TURNOVER of the 
co-op. Turnover ranged from R2 000 to R1 000 236 giving a range of R998 236, thus indicating 
larger variability across co-ops. The average turnover was R261 338.74, with a standard 
deviation of R284 691.03, giving a coefficient of variation of 91.80 percent. It can be noted that 
there is higher variability in turnover among the co-ops. It is believed that some of the co-ops 
in the country are able to secure contracts with government to supply the school feeding 
schemes. Those co-ops with government contracts may be contributing to such high variability 
in turnover. This is also supported by the fact that the data were positively skewed with at least 
half of the co-ops having a turnover of R150 000 and less. This resulted in the distribution of 
the turnovers being skewed as supported by a skewness of 1.484. Positive skewness values 
indicate the clustering of scores towards the left of the graph (Leedy & Ormrod, 2015). It is 
evident from the study that some of the co-ops have very low turnover to make a meaningful 
impact and be sustainable as fully fledged businesses in line with the observations by Adefila 
(2012). * 
 62 
 
The study indicates that the membership for each co-op ranges from five members to 21, the 
average membership is nine. At least 50 percent of the co-ops have a membership of seven 
people or fewer. The standard deviation is 5.13 and a coefficient of variation of 57.15 percent, 
which is far away from the 0 percent, which implies no variability and suggests that our 
variability is higher. The membership was further skewed and peaked as supported by the 
skewness and kurtosis of 1.368 and .638, respectively. Positive kurtosis values indicate that 
distribution along the graph is peaked with long thin tails (Pallant, 2001). Membership is 
therefore not normally distributed. The baseline study by the dti (2001) indicates that a majority 
(about 65 percent) of the co-ops in South Africa have a membership of fewer than 10 people, 
with less than 12 percent of them with a membership in excess of 100 members. Clustering of 
primary co-ops into secondary co-ops to capitalize on market opportunities may be a 
contributing factor to the large variability in membership. Banaszak (2008) also finds a large 
variability in member sizes of producer groups in Poland.  
The wages of the co-ops ranged from R300 to R110 000, giving a range of R109 700 citing a 
large variability. This is also supported by a standard deviation of R31 473.99, giving a 
coefficient of variation of 95 percent, which is far from 0 percent when there is no variability. 
The average wages paid by the co-ops were R33 056.46.  This indicates that on average, the 
co-ops spend close to R33 000 a year in wages and at least 50 percent of the co-ops incur wages 
of R22 000. Wages were also heavily skewed and peaked with skewness and kurtosis of 1.284 
and .703 respectively, thus data was not normally distributed. This suggests that some of the 
co-ops can barely afford to create sustainable employment.  
Membership fees represent commitment from members as they join the co-ops. The results 
indicated that membership fees contributed ranged from R120 to R12 500, giving a range of 
R12 380 with a standard deviation of R3 975.162 and a coefficient of variation of 102.3 percent, 
citing larger variability. This shows the large difference in membership fee contribution among 
the co-ops. The average membership fee and median were R3 885.68 and R2 500, respectively. 
At least 50 percent of the co-ops received R2 500 in membership fees. On average, the members 
contributed R3 975.16 annually in membership fees. The variability can once more be 
explained by the number of primary producer co-ops who probably bind together to form a 
secondary co-op in order to pursue market opportunities.  
The number of years that the co-ops have been in operation ranges from 1 to 16 years. It means 
that some of the co-ops had their first year of operation in 2013. The average mean was 6.33 
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years and with a median of 5. The standard deviation was 4.19 giving a coefficient of variation 
of 66.19 percent. This shows that the majority of the co-operatives have not been in existence 
for a long time. The development of a majority of emerging cooperatives in South Africa was 
influenced by the new policy in 2005 which is more inclusive (dti, 2001).  
4.4 Correlation analysis 
The extent of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables was established 
through the Pearson’s correlation coefficient. The Pearson correlation measures the degree and 
the direction of the linear relationship between the variables (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017). 
According to Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010), correlation coefficient indicates the 
strength of the association between two metric variables, where + or – indicates the direction 
of the relationship. The values range from -1 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect correlation among 
the variables, irrespective of the sign and a correlation of 0 indicating that no relationship exists 
between the two variables (Pallant, 2001). Table 6 shows the results of the correlations analysis 
between the dependent variable TURNOVER and the explanatory continuous variables. As 
mentioned in the methodology, Cohen (1988) stated that if r = .10 - .29 then there is a low effect 
(low correlation); r = .30 - .49 has a medium effect (moderate correlation) and r = .50 - .99 has 
a large effect (strong correlation). The hypothesis test was set at the 5 percent level of 
significance. A p-value of less than .05 would lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis 
indicating lack of correlation, while a p-value of less than .01 indicated that the correlations 
were highly significant.  
Table 6: Correlation analysis of TURNOVER with the explanatory variables 
Construct Mean TURNO
VER 
MEMEB
RESHIP 
WAGES MEMER
SHIP 
FEE 
NUMBE
R OF 
YEARS 
1. TURNOVER 261 338.74 -     
2. MEMBERSHIP 8.98 .148** -    
3. WAGES  33 056.46 .730** .085** -   
4. MEMBERSHIP 
FEE 
3 885.68 .296** .251** .034 -  
 64 
 
5. NUMBER IN 
YEARS 
OPERATION  
6.18 -.068* .260** -.018 -.010                                                                                                                -
 
The results depicted the initial statistically significant strong positive correlation of the 
dependent variable TURNOVER with wages (𝑟 = .730, 𝑝 < .01). From these results, it is 
shown that high levels of turnover are associated with high levels of wages. Thus, the co-ops 
with high performance are associated with high levels of wages, probably due to the large 
number of employees employed by the business. TURNOVER had a weak statistically 
significant positive relationship with MEMBERSHIP (𝑟 = .296, 𝑝 < .01) and MEMBERSHIP 
FEE (𝑟 = .251, 𝑝 < .01). There was a weak statistically significant relationship between 
TURNOVER and OPER (number of years in operation).  
The results in Table 6 show no evidence of strong correlations between the independent 
variables. Multicollinearity occurs when a single independent variable is highly correlated with 
a set of other independent variables (Hair et al., 2014), 𝑟 = .9 and above (Pallant, 2007). All 
correlations are less than .3. The independent variable MEMBERSHIP had a statistical 
significant weak positive correlation with WAGES (𝑟 = .085, 𝑝 < .01) and MEMBERSHIP 
FEES (𝑟 = .243, 𝑝 < .01). WAGES also has a weak association with MEMBERSHIP FEE 
(𝑟 = .251, 𝑝 < .01). It can be concluded that there are no high correlations among the 
independent variables. 
4.5 Regression analysis models  
In order to determine the factors that impact on the performance of emerging agricultural co-
operatives, the relationship between performance (TURNOVER) and the identified 
determinants, three econometric models were fitted to the data. Firstly, the dependent variable 
TURNOVER model is fitted with all independent variables; secondly without manager’s 
qualification and the third model without manager’s qualification and number of years in 
operation.  The models were formulated from theory and are given below: 
TURNOVER model 1: All independent variables 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 
𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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TURNOVER model 2: All independent variables except manager’s qualification 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 
+𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
TURNOVER model 3: All independent variables except manager’s qualification and number 
of years in operation 
𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑛𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑛𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where i = entity and t=time. 
In this case, the managers’ qualification and number of years in operation had a lot of missing 
observations which are more than 5 percent, as mentioned in the methodology. With panel data 
being used in this study, the first test conducted was the Hausman Test to determine if the model 
was fixed effects (FE) or random effects (RE). 
4.5.1 Hausman Test for the models 
The Hausman Test was used to decide whether to use an FEM or an REM by identifying the 
presence of endogeneity in the explanatory variables (Sheytanova, 2014). The Hausman Test 
tests the null hypothesis that the preferred model is random effects versus the alternative which 
is the fixed effects (Greene, 2008).  The null hypothesis is: 
𝐻0 : 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is not correlated with Xi (random-effects model is appropriate) 
H1: 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is correlated with Xi (fixed-effects model is appropriate) 
According to Torres-Reyna (2007), the Hausman Test tests whether the unique errors (𝜀𝑖𝑡) are 
correlated with the regressors. The null hypothesis is they are not. Table 7 shows the results of 
the three models. 
Table 7: Hausman Test for the models 
Summary statistic  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chi-sq statistic (𝝌𝟐)  70.23 179.98 107.73 
Chi-sq. d.f  7 6 5 
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Prob (p-value)  𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 
Decision  Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 
 
The p-values in all the models are highly significant at less than .01, thus leading to the rejection 
of the null hypothesis that the random effects model is appropriate. It can be concluded that all 
the three models were FEMs. The cross-section FEM was therefore appropriate. 
4.5.2 Diagnostic tests for the fixed effects model 
The data was tested for heteroscedasticity using Wald tests for group-wise heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation was tested using Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data.  
4.5.2.1 Testing for heteroscedasticity for the models 
The Wald tests for heteroscedasticity tests the null hypothesis that there is homoscedasticity (or 
constant variance). The results of the test for constant variance are shown in Table 8 and the 
hypothesis to be tested are: 
𝐻0 : 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎2 for all i  
H1: 𝜎𝑖
2 ≠ 𝜎2 for some i 
 
Table 8: Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity for the models 
Test summary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Chi-sq statistic (𝝌𝟐) 3.5 × 106  3.4 × 105 5.3 × 109 
Chi-sq. d.f 149 250 282 
Prob (p-value) 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 
Decision Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 
 
All three the p-values are less than .05 and the null hypothesis for homoscedasticity is rejected, 
that is, the constant variance and it is concluded that there is a presence of heteroscedasticity in 
the data. Heteroscedasticity can cause difficulties in regression analyses as it invalidates the 
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significance tests for regressions (Martins & Lucado, 2015). Therefore, this calls for robust 
estimation in all the three models.  
4.5.2.2 Testing for autocorrelation for the models 
The Woolridge Test for autocorrelation was done to test the null hypothesis that there is no 
serial autocorrelation. Results of the tests are shown in. Table 9.  
 
𝐻0 : No first-order autocorrelation 
H1: There is first order autocorrelation 
Table 9: Woolridge Test for autocorrelation for the models 
Test summary Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
F-statistic (𝐹) 8.351 13.077 19.679 
d.f (1, 148) (1, 249) (1, 281) 
Prob > F (p-value) 𝑝 = .004 𝑝 < .001 𝑝 < .001 
Decision Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 Reject 𝐻0 
 
Looking at Table 9: Woolridge Test for autocorrelation for the models 
all the p-values are less than .05 and the null hypothesis of no first order correlations is 
rejected. It can be concluded that there is serial correlation in the data. Therefore, the robust 
estimators should be used. 
4.5.3 The fitted fixed effects regression models 
Looking at the diagnostic test results, the data had heteroscedasticity and was not auto-
correlated. Robust standard error estimates for linear panel models were used for the data. The 
FEM was therefore fitted with robust standard errors. 
4.5.3.1 Model 1 with TURNOVER as the dependent variable with all the variables 
The membership fee, access to loans and rural-urban-based classification of co-ops were 
omitted from the model due to collinearity in the panel data. Table 10 summarizes the results 
for TURNOVER model using all the independent variables.  
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Table 10: Regression results: LNTURNOVER dependent variable with all variables 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficients Robust std. 
err 
T P>|t| 
MEMB -.0001 .0098 .01 .994 
LNWAGES .5101 .0683 7.47 𝑝 < .001 
GRANT -.1197 .0987 -1.21 .227 
TRAINING -.363 .0479 -7.58 𝑝 < .001 
LAND -.0474 .0346 1.37 .174 
OPER .0904 .0142 6.39 𝑝 < .001 
QUAL -.1102 .1151 -0.96 .340 
_cons 6.7429 .6515 10.35 𝑝 < .001 
 
From the regression results, the variables that do not have an influence on TURNOVER are 
membership, access to grant and qualification of managers. The results further indicate that 
access to grant has no influence on TURNOVER. This is in contradiction to our expectation 
and also rejects the result of the study by Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005) who find 
government support factors to impact positively on performance of a co-op. However, the 
outcome is in line with the findings of the study by Mubigiri et al. (2016) who find a 
significantly negative correlation between performance of an agricultural co-op and subsidy 
provision from government or donor agencies. Perhaps opportunistic behaviour from people 
who join co-ops to access government incentives may play a role in the finding. 
The variables that impact significantly on TURNOVER are wages (WAGES), training 
(TRAINING) and number of years in operation (OPER). All the variables are highly significant 
at 1 percent level of significance. Since the dependent variable was log transformed, the 
coefficients are interpreted in the context of the geometric mean rather than the arithmetic mean.  
For every 10 percent increase in wages, performance increases by 4.98 percent 
(1.10.5101=1.0498). The expected percent decrease in geometric mean from those with training 
to those without is about 30.4 percent (exp(-.363)= .696)) holding other variables constant.  
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The number of years in practice allows for the acquisition of skills and experience necessary 
for the efficient running of the enterprise and improving performance (Mathuva & Kiweu, 
2016). The results of the study indicated that as the years of operation increased by one unit, 
performance increased by 9.5 percent. Therefore, the number of years in operation had a 
positive impact on performance. The constant had a geometric mean of R848.02 (exp(6.7429)). 
Thus the expected geometric mean of TURNOVER is R848.02. 
4.5.3.2 Model 2: TURNOVER as the dependent variable without manager’s qualifications 
The manager’s qualification had about 43.5 percent missing information. Since the missing 
information was more than 5 percent, the model was fitted without the variable. The model 
omitted membership fee, access to loans and rural-urban-based classification of co-ops due to 
collinearity in the panel data. Table 11 summarizes the results for TURNOVER model using 
all the independent variables, except managers’ qualification.  
Table 11: Regression results: LNTURNOVER dependent variable with all variables except 
for manager qualification 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coefficients Robust std. 
err 
T P>|t| 
MEMB -.0121 .0073 -1.65 .101 
LNWAGES .3764 .0557 6.76 𝑝 < .001 
GRANT -.2212 .0812 -2.73 .007 
TRAINING -.3190 .0611 -5.22 𝑝 < .001 
LAND .0217 .0310 0.70 .484 
OPER .0818 .0112 7.33 𝑝 < .001 
_cons 7.9654 .5344 14.91 𝑝 < .001 
 
Looking at Table 11, membership and access to land do not have an impact on the performance 
of the co-op. The variables that impact significantly on TURNOVER are wages (WAGES), 
access to grant (GRANT), access to training (TRAINING) and the number of years in operation 
(OPER), in confirmation of the results obtained in the previous section. All the variables are 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance with WAGES, TRAINING and OPER being 
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highly significant. A 10 percent increase in wages results in expected increase in performance 
of 3.65 percent (1.10.3764=1.0365). 
The expected percentage decrease in geometric mean from those with access to grant to those 
without is about 19.8 percent [exp(-.2212)= .802)] holding other variables constant. Access to 
grant funding or rather government support factor, does not support our hypothesis that 
government support factors have a positive impact on success of emerging agricultural co-ops. 
In fact, the results point to the contrary and find a statistically weak negative relationship 
between performance and outside assistance such as subsidies from government or donor 
agencies. It is not immediately clear what could have influenced the outcome, given that 
smallholder producers are poor and government support is critical in providing start-up capital. 
Perhaps this is an indication of co-ops that start due to government influence as well as the 
incentives made available. Secondly, it could be that members lack an identity with the co-op 
and are therefore always looking at government to intervene without being willing to contribute 
financially towards the operations of the co-op.  
The expected percentage decrease in geometric mean from those with training to those without 
training is about 27.3 percent [exp(-.319)= .727], holding other variables constant. The number 
of years in operation had a positive impact on performance. As the years in operation increase 
by one unit, performance increase by 8.5 percent (exp(.0818)= 1.085). The result confirms the 
finding previously on the number of years in operation. The constant had a geometric mean of 
R2 979.58 (exp(7.9654)). Thus, the expected geometric mean of TURNOVER is R2 979.58.  
4.5.3.3 Model 3: Turnover as the dependent variable with all the independent variables 
except manager qualifications and number of years in operation 
Membership fee, access to loans and rural-urban-based classification of co-op were omitted 
from the model due to collinearity in the panel data. The table summarizes the results for 
TURNOVER model using all the variables except managers’ qualification and number of years 
in operation. The results are shown in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Regression results: LTURNOVER dependent variable with all variables except 
manager qualification and number of years in operation 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Coefficients Robust std. 
err 
T-value P>|t| 
MEMB -.0034 .0078 -.44 .663 
LNWAGES .4759 .0507 9.38 𝑝 < .001 
GRANT -.0736 .0773 -.95 .342 
TRAINING -.3111 .1586 -1.96 . 051 
LAND -.0458 .0287 -1.59 .112 
_cons 7.3964 .5295 13.97 𝑝 < .001 
 
Looking at Table 12, membership (MEMB), access to grant (GRANT), training (TRAINING) 
and access to land (LAND) do not have an impact on performance of the co-op. The variable 
that impacts significantly on TURNOVER is wages (WAGES) and it is significant at 5 percent 
level of significance. A 10 percent increase in wages results in an expected increase of 4.64 
percent (1.10.4759=1.0464) in performance. The constant had a geometric mean of R1 630.11 
[exp(7.3964)]. As a result, the expected geometric mean of TURNOVER is R1 630.11. 
Looking at the three models the variables that impact significantly on TURNOVER are 
membership (MEMB), wages (WAGES), training (TRAINING) and number of years in 
operation (OPER). Membership and training tend to have a negative effect while wages and 
number of years in operation tend to have a positive effect.  
4.6 Independent t-tests to determine performance determinants 
The independent t-test was used to determine whether performance differed by access to grant, 
access to loans, type of training, access to land and whether the co-op is located in a province 
composed mainly of rural dwellers or urban dwellers. There are three assumptions made by the 
independent t-test, firstly the tests assume that observations within each sample must be 
independent; secondly, the two populations from which the sample are selected must be normal 
and third assumption is that of equal variances (Gravetter & Wallnau, 2017). Independence was 
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met since the observations were randomly selected. Normality was achieved by using the 
central limit since the observations were more than 30.  
Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances are the most robust when we have skewed data and 
are highly sensitive to variations in distribution. The test was used to determine whether the 
variances were equal. In cases were the variances were equal, statistics under equal variances 
assumed were discussed and in cases where the variances were not equal, statistics under equal 
variance not assumed were discussed. The independent t-test was performed at the 5 percent 
level of significance and the null hypothesis was rejected if the p-value was significant or less 
than .05. The test was highly significant if p-value is less than .01. The assumption of equal 
variance was tested using the Levene’s test for equality of variance and all p-values were greater 
than .05 except for access to grants, access to loans and rural-urban classification of co-ops in 
terms of province. In this case, statistics under equal variances not assumed were discussed for 
the variables. The test of equality of means are shown in Table 13. 
Table 13: Independent t-test to determine impact on performance 
Variable Group Group statistics Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
T-test for Equality of 
Means 
N Mean Std 
deviation 
F Sig Equal 
Varianc
es 
t-
value 
Sig (2 
–
tailed 
p-
score) 
GRANT No 629 257 672.59 294 621.91 6.388 .012 Assume
d  
-.432 .666 
Yes 796 264 235.73 276 744.13   Not -.429 .668 
LOAN No 1360 259 533.58 280 423.95 15.019 𝑝
< .001 
Assume
d  
-1.095 . 274 
Yes 65 299 108.06 363 320.30   Not -.866 . 390 
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Variable Group Group statistics Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
T-test for Equality of 
Means 
N Mean Std 
deviation 
F Sig Equal 
Varianc
es 
t-
value 
Sig (2 
–
tailed 
p-
score) 
TRAINI
NG 
No 570 270 566.86 313 599.33 31.541 𝑝
< .001 
Assume
d  
.999 .318 
Yes 855 255 186.65 263 676.95   Not .965 .335 
LAND No 1219 267 417.59 289 678.09 7.264 .007 Assume
d 
1.963 .050 
Yes 206 225 367.24 250 809.79   Not 2.174 .030 
QUAL Non-
tertiary 
246 251 458.27 262 580.93 16.656 𝑝
< .001 
Assume
d 
-2.361 .018 
Tertiary 559 306 274.79 319 767.56   Not -2.547 .011 
URBAN Rural 735 266 508.92 283 662.51 .825 . 364 Assume
d  
.707 .479 
Urban 690 255 831.37 285 885.41   Not .707 .480 
 
The independent t-tests indicated that access to grants (GRANT), access to loans (LOAN), 
access to training (TRAINING) and classification of a co-op in terms of province being rural 
or urban (URBAN) had no significant impact on performance. Access to land (LAND) and 
manager qualification (QUAL) had a significant impact on performance. 
In terms of access to land, there was a difference in mean scores between those who had access 
to land under a specific tenure arrangement and those who did not specify the tenure 
arrangement, with a p-value of .030 (t(305.232) = 2.174, p =  .030), leading to the difference 
in means. The mean score and standard deviation for those who specified the tenure 
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arrangements were (M= 225 367.24, 𝑆𝐷 =  250 809.79), while for those who did not 
specify the tenure arrangement were (M= 267 417.59, 𝑆𝐷 =  289 678.09). The magnitude 
of the difference in the means (mean difference = 42 050.35, 95% 𝐶𝐼: 3 985.15 to 80 115.55) 
was of a small effect (eta-squared = .2). Those who have specified the type of tenure 
arrangements had a significantly lower mean than those who have not specified the type of 
tenure arrangements as shown in the confidence interval error bars shown in Figure 3 below.  
 
Figure 3: Confidence interval error bars for TURNOVER by access to land 
The confidence interval error bars are slightly overlapping, showing that there is a difference 
in means. Those who did not specify the nature of tenure arrangements tend to perform better 
than those who have specified the tenure arrangements. There is larger variability or rather 
dispersion for those who specified the nature of tenure than those who did not specify.  
Manager’s qualification had a p-value of .011 (t(563.718) = −2.547, p =  .011), which is 
less than .05, thus the means were significantly different. The means and standard deviations 
for those who did not have a tertiary qualification was (M= 251 458.27, 𝑆𝐷 = 262 580.93) 
and those who had a tertiary qualification it was (M= 306 274.79, 𝑆𝐷 = 319 767.56), 
respectively. The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference = −54 816.52,
95% 𝐶𝐼: -97 089.69 to -12 543.36) was of a small effect (eta-squared = .01). The confidence 
interval error bar is shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Confidence interval error bars for performance by manager qualification 
Looking at Figure 4, there is no overlap in the confidence interval error bars from those who 
had tertiary qualifications and those who did not. Those with a tertiary qualification had a 
significantly higher mean than those without. Manager qualification had a positive effect on 
performance of the co-op. However, the length of the error bar for those who did not have a 
tertiary qualification showed that there was larger variability in performance than those who 
had a tertiary. Those who did not have tertiary qualification tend to have upper limit of turnover 
below R300 000 while those with tertiary qualifications tended to have the lower limit of 
turnover above R275 000. Therefore, the managers with a tertiary qualification recorded the 
highest turnover or, rather, had the highest performance. This finding is in line with the 
expectations of the study and is also corroborated by some studies (Dejene & Getachew, 2015; 
Adefi & Okurut, 2008). 
4.7 ANOVA tests to determine the determinants of performance  
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether the variables 
province, access to loans, access to land and manager qualifications had an impact on 
performance. The same assumptions as the independent t-tests applied. In the case where the 
assumption of equal variance was violated and the test was significant, the Welch robust test of 
equality of means was used and the Games-Howell test was used as a post hoc test. In the case 
where the tests of homogeneity were not significant (p-value more than .05), the Tukey b post 
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hoc tests was used to determine where the differences lie. The ANOVA test results are 
presented in the next subsection.  
The Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances resulted in all tests having p-values less than 
.05 for provinces, access to loans, access to land and manager qualifications, with p-values of 
less than .001, less than .001, 013 and .001. In this case, the Welch Robust tests for equality of 
means was used. The results of the Welch tests are shown in Table 14. 
Table 14: Welch robust test to determine determinants of performance 
Variable Test Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Province Welch 65.538 7 457.268 𝑝 < .001 
Brown-Forsythe 62.493 7 936.041 𝑝 < .001 
Access to loan Welch 51.059 2 166.203 𝑝 < .001 
Brown-Forsythe 39.683 2 175.438 𝑝 < .001 
Access to land Welch 2.994 3 90.457 .035 
Brown-Forsythe 2.984 3 149.457 .033 
Manager’s 
qualification 
Welch 2.500 3 151.034 .062 
Brown-Forsythe 2.515 3 263.595 . 059 
 
All the variables had a significant impact on performance, except for manager qualifications. 
Province, access to loan and access to land were determinant factors on TURNOVER. Results 
for ANOVA tests for performance by province indicated significant difference (𝐹(7,1417) =
 62.425 , 𝑝 < .001. However, as a result of the unequal variances, the Welch robust test of 
equality of means was used to determine whether indeed the differences do exist. The Welch 
robust test resulted in a p-value less than .001 (𝐹(7,457.268) =  65.538 , 𝑝 < .001) and thus 
the mean performances were significantly different across province. The effect size calculated 
using eta squared, was .024 which is considered a large effect (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, 24 
percent variability in performance is accounted for by province. The Games-Howell post hoc 
test resulted in six homogeneous groups as shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Games-Howell homogeneous groups for performance by province 
 
Province N 
  Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Games-
Howell 
Northern Cape 295 108767.36      
Free State 75 145333.33 145333.33     
Eastern Cape 125  229078.66 229078.66 229078.66   
North West 130   229707.73 229707.73   
KwaZulu- 
Natal 
320 
 
 235470.07  
  
Gauteng 225    311328.18 311328.18  
Limpopo 160 
 
 
 
 387729.9
7 
 
Western Cape 95 
 
 
 
 
 
668299.2
8 
 
The WC (𝑀 = 668 299.28, 𝑆𝐷 = 293 157.49) was significantly different from all the other 
provinces and it was the province with the highest mean performance. Mean performance for 
NC (𝑀 = 108 767.36, 𝑆𝐷 = 173 636.29) was the lowest. The major difference was between 
NC and WC. This is also supported by non-overlapping of the groups as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 Figure 5: Confidence interval error bars for TURNOVER by province 
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The province with the lowest standard deviation is NC. It can be observed that the provinces 
with the highest mean performance are WC and Lim. Both the NC and WC provinces, in 
accordance with Stats SA classification, fall within the category of those with most urban 
dwellers. The results do not provide a clear picture if there is a difference in performance of co-
ops in terms of rural or urban basis.  
The one-way analysis of variance tests results for access to loan indicated a statistical 
significance difference (𝐹(2, 1422) = 55.883 , 𝑝 < .001. Since the variances were not equal, 
the Welch robust tests for equality of means was performed and it gave the same p-value of less 
than .001 (𝐹(2, 166.203) =  51.059 , 𝑝 < .001). Thus, the means were significantly different 
across categories of access to loans. The effect size, calculated using omega squared, was .07 
which is considered of moderate effect (Cohen, 1988). Thus, 7 percent of the variability in 
performance is accounted for by access to loan. The Games-Howell post hoc test resulted in 
two homogeneous group as shown in Table 16. 
Table 16: Games-Howell homogeneous groups for performance by access to loan 
 
Access to land N 
Subset for alpha = 0.05 
1 2 
Games 
Howell 
Not specified 813 195403.93  
Named 65 299108.06 299108.06 
None 547  354848.77 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean performance for 
not specified (𝑀 = 195403.93, 𝑆𝐷 = 227799.17) was the lowest while the mean 
performance for none (𝑀 = 354848.77, 𝑆𝐷 = 321451.52) was the highest. The major 
difference was between not specified and none. The confidence interval error bars are shown 
in Figure 6.  
 79 
 
 
Figure 6: Confidence interval error bars for TURNOVER by access to loan 
Those with loans had the highest variability as evidenced by the length of the error bar. Mean 
performance for those not specified was significantly different from those with none. Those 
without loans tend to have a higher turnover, that is, they seem to be performing better. Access 
to loans had a positive effect on performance of the co-op. Smallholder producers are 
constrained by a lack of access to finance such as loans and credit. It therefore stands to show 
that co-ops can potentially improve their performance when they have access to finance. This 
is in line with Fowowe (2017) who asserts that finance allows businesses to expand operations 
and impact positively on employment growth. There is no immediate explanation for the lowest 
performance shown by turnover of just over R200 000 in co-ops who did not specify access. 
Perhaps the lowest mean could be the result of constant underperformance due to co-ops not 
being able to meet member objectives as a result of financial constraints. 
The ANOVA test results for access to land indicated no significant difference (𝐹(3, 1421) =
 2.387 , 𝑝 = .067. However, since the variances were not equal, the Welch robust tests for 
equality of means was performed and it gave a p-value of .035 (𝐹(3, 90.457) =  2.994 , 𝑝 =
.035). Therefore, the means were significantly different across categories of access to land. The 
effect size, calculated using omega squared, was .006 which is considered of small effect 
(Cohen, 1988). Thus, the .6 percent of the variability in performance is accounted for by access 
to land. The Games-Howell post hoc test resulted in two homogeneous group as shown in  
 
Table 17: Games-Howell homogeneous groups for performance by access to land 
 Access to land N Subset for alpha = 0.05 
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1 2 
Games 
Howell 
Communal/Tribal land 128 198022.50  
Bonded/Title deed 41 257409.76 257409.76 
Not specified 1219  267417.59 
Lease agreement 37 257409.76 257409.76 
 
Post hoc comparisons using the Games-Howell test indicated that the mean performance for 
not specified (𝑀 = 267417.59, 𝑆𝐷 = 289678.09) was significantly higher than the mean 
performance for tribal or communal land (𝑀 = 198022.50, 𝑆𝐷 = 247244.70). The major 
difference was between these two groups. This is also supported by non-overlapping of the 
groups as shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Confidence interval error bars for TURNOVER by access to land 
Those with lease agreements had the highest variability as evidenced by a longer error bar. Co-
ops on leased land also had a higher performance than the rest of the group, shown by the 
highest TURNOVER recorded between R30 000 and R400 000. Leases turn to provide 
producers with the flexibility to expand production, be it with cattle or crop, without having to 
incur the large capital costs and debt associated with the purchase of land.  
Mean performance for not specified was significantly different from communal/tribal land. 
Those under communal land tend to perform the worst of all categories. The majority of the co-
ops (85 percent) in the study did not specify the nature of tenure arrangements. Perhaps most 
of those who did not specify the nature of tenure arrangements form part of the beneficiaries of 
the land reform programme, where government purchased land on behalf of the farmers. 
However, there seems to be a decline in performance on land reform farms as indicated in a 
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study by Kirsten et al. (2009) who discovered a general downward trend of about 62 percent in 
performance of the land reform projects in the NW province. 
The ANOVA test results on the performance resulted in no significant differences across 
manager’s qualification (𝐹(3,801) = 2.053 , 𝑝 = .105). However, since the variances were 
not equal, the Welch Robust tests of equality of means was used and a p-value of .062 
(𝐹(3, 151.034) =  2.500 , 𝑝 = .062) was obtained, which showed that the means were not 
significantly different across manager’s qualification. This is in line with Azadi et al. (2010); 
Karami and Rzaei-Moghaddam (2008) who do not find any significant impact of managerial 
educational qualifications on performance. 
4.8 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter provided descriptive results of the analysis of factors that determine performance 
of emerging agricultural co-ops in South Africa. Correlation analysis showed no evidence of 
correlation among the explanatory variables. The data were fitted to the three models to 
determine performance. Robust tests were conducted for all three models, due to presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the data. Four of the hypothesized variables came out with a significant 
relationship on turnover. The variables with significant impact on TURNOVER were 
membership (MEMB), wages (WAGES), training (TRAINING) and number of years in 
operation (OPER). Membership and training had a negative effect, while wages and number of 
years in operation had a positive effect.  
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
5.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the key findings obtained in Chapter 4 on the analysis of the factors that 
determine success of emerging agricultural co-ops in South Africa. The study associates 
performance of an agricultural co-op with the co-op’s continued ability to achieve the objectives 
as set by the members. In the case of this study, turnover is regarded as a measure for 
performance.  
5.2 Overview of the key factors that determine performance 
Agricultural co-ops offer an efficient and effective means for government to provide 
intervention measures to a large grouping of farmers as opposed to targeting individual farmers. 
In assessing the factors that determine performance of emerging agricultural co-ops, 
conclusions reached from the descriptive results in Chapter 4 indicate that factors that had a 
significant impact on performance are membership, training, wages and the number of years in 
operation. 
5.2.1 Membership  
The study finds that a large membership impacts negatively on the performance of an emerging 
agricultural co-op, in contradiction to our expectations and also rejecting the findings by 
Bazasnak (2008), Adefila (2012), and Martens and Lucato (2017); who find a positive 
relationship between a large group and performance of a co-op. Ideally, a large membership 
has to contribute towards lowering costs per unit due to shared resources among the farmers. 
This may be the reason behind the positive relationship between performance and a large 
membership. In South Africa, most of the production occurs in the rural centres and the produce 
is transported mostly by road to the urban centres where the main markers are located. It is a 
common occurrence for the smallholder producers in a co-op to use common transport to the 
markets. Bazasnak (2008), however, credits the positive relation of a large group to a strong 
manager, rather than the group itself, thus indicating that the large group itself does not entirely 
explain performance of a co-op in the absence of the manager who plays a central role in the 
coordination of group activities and ensures access to markets at best prices. 
The findings, however, corroborate with Karami and Rezaei-Moghaddam (2005), and Mubirigi, 
Shukla and Mbeche (2016) who found a negative relationship between co-op membership size 
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and performance. A multitude of factors can explain the results, among those being the financial 
incentives provided by government to start up co-ops in an effort to drive participatory 
development in rural areas. South Africa is characterized by high unemployment levels. The 
incentives by government might have unintended consequences of attracting individuals with 
no particular interest in farming, but driven by unemployment to gain access to government 
resources. This in turn breeds conditions conducive to free-riding and rent-seeking behaviour, 
hence the negative performance of co-ops and subsequent high failure rate. 
5.2.2 Training  
The results of the study showed a significant negative association between training and 
performance of a co-op. This contradicted our expectation as well as the findings by Mubirigi 
et al. (2016), but corroborated the findings of Khan et al. (2016). Investment in human capital 
through learning and training outside of the school environment is always linked to newly 
acquired skills and improved productivity as noted by Krasniqi and Topxhiu (2016). The strong 
negative impact of training on performance of the co-op can explain uncoordinated efforts from 
government through the various departments that provide support to train the co-ops in the 
agricultural sector. Largely, the training is never accompanied by resources to ensure 
replication and adoption. It is known that smallholder farmers have poor access to credit and 
lack resources, including production inputs such as fertilizers and seeds. Without access to 
resources, the acquired knowledge cannot be implemented (Mubigiri et al. 2016).  
5.2.3 Number of years in operation 
The number of years that the co-op has been in operation (OPER) show a significantly positive 
effect with performance of a co-op in line with our expectations. The results also corroborate 
the findings by Mubigiri et al. (2016), Adefila (2012) and Bond (2009). Adefila (2012) equates 
the number of years in business to experience, which in turn contributes to performance. The 
results contradict the findings by Azadi et al. (2010) who found no significant correlation 
between performance and the number of years in operation. According to Azadi et al. (2010:94), 
success does not equate to sustained results, but to “short-term, tactical or temporal 
achievement”. However, in line with this study, Khan et al. (2015) associate performance of a 
co-op with its ability to sustain itself over an extended period of time. This is in line with this 
study whereby the sample was selected based on the number of years that the co-op was in 
business. The initial three years of the business are the most critical. Usually, most of the start-
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up businesses fail during this period; time offers an opportunity to learn by doing and also for 
mistakes to be corrected. 
5.2.4 Wages 
Wages are not widely used in imperial to determine performance of a co-op. The researcher 
included the variable as generated by the CODA system. The results indicate a significantly 
positive relation with performance. Workers receive wages in exchange of their labour in a 
firm. Businesses that have a high number of workers turn to have high levels of wages as 
opposed to the businesses with a lower number of employees. This finding is in line with the 
expectations of the study, where the expectation was for co-ops that generate high levels of 
revenue to have high levels of wages. The finding confirms the potential role that co-ops can 
play in income distribution in the rural areas as well as in absorbing excess unemployment and 
thus contribute to development. At the same time the findings reject a study by Bell and Van 
Reenen (2012), who find a weak correlation between firm success and wages. 
5.3 Summary and conclusions 
This research concludes that membership, wages, years in operation and training play a 
significant role in explaining revenue and thus performance of an emerging agricultural co-op. 
However, there may be other underlying factors not explored by the study such as technological 
innovation, the tax burden, natural factors such as rainfall and market incentives which may 
impact on performance of emerging agricultural co-ops. Some of the inconclusive findings in 
the study may be due to the sample selection biases which looked at co-ops with at least five 
years of business experience by 2017, from 2013. The presence of primary data could have 
allowed expansion of the study by doing propensity score matching to establish the effect of 
regressors in determining the effects on returns of the co-ops and broadly on province bases.  
5.4 Policy implications and recommendations 
Co-ops should be allowed to mushroom organically at grassroots level, based on identified 
problems commonly shared among the co-operators. It will allow members to have a strong 
sense of identity with the co-op and most probably be willing to voluntarily contribute 
financially towards the operations of the co-op. As a result, government involvement should be 
to ensure provision of an environment conducive for co-ops to thrive. The possibility of 
ensuring that the financial and other resources advanced to the businesses are repaid to replenish 
the fund in such a way that it is able to assist the new entrants should be considered. In essence, 
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government and funding institutions should implement funding programmes that give co-ops access 
to credit.  
On an ongoing basis, training should be provided to co-operators starting the process before the 
registration to ensure that participants understand the legal entity they are due to embark on. 
Training should further be targeted and specific to the activities of individual co-ops, with 
DAFF as the lead department in the sector being at the centre of all efforts geared towards 
interventions aimed at emerging agricultural co-ops. It will be wasteful if the training provided 
is not in line with what the co-op does. Providing tractor maintenance training to co-operators 
who do not own a tractor can prove futile as the skill may not be implemented after the training. 
It is therefore essential that co-operators are equipped with basic resources to allow them to put 
the training into practice. This serves a s a basis for the partnerships between business and 
government in the implementation of the Sector Transformation Codes to ensure increased 
participation in the sector.   
5.5 Future research 
Due to limitation of information, the researcher considered turnover as the only dependent 
variable to assess performance of an emerging agricultural co-op. Co-ops pursue multiple 
objectives, without necessarily looking at maximizing profits. Further research opportunities 
should consider enriching this study on the assessment of factors that determine performance 
of emerging agricultural co-ops by exploring other dependent variables which include an 
increase in the size of membership, degree of trust among the members and knowledge of 
cooperative principles by the members.  
The study also found an insignificant, but negative, relation between performance of an 
emerging agricultural co-op and grant funding. The study can further be enriched by exploring 
this negative relation to inform policy in the support of emerging agricultural co-ops who turn 
to be dependent on government support for equity capital, infrastructure development and a 
host of other requirements.  
The researcher further suggests further studies that will establish the role of entrepreneurship 
and technology on performance of emerging agricultural co-ops.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1:  Summary of the selected variables and their impact on performance of 
agricultural cooperatives 
Author(s) year and 
region 
Nature of 
data and 
time span 
Regressand Regressor(s) Estimation 
technique 
Main 
Findings 
Martins, F.S. and 
Lucato, W.C. (2017) 
 
Brazil 
Panel  
 
 
Net sales billed 
(NSB), 
 
Return on sales 
(ROS),  
 
Return 
on capital 
employed 
(ROCE),  
 
Current liquidity 
ratio (LIQ)  
 
The debt ratio 
(END) 
Horizontal 
diversification  
 
Lateral diversification  
 
Vertical 
diversification 
  
Operating area 
 
Number of associates  
Operating time (no. of 
years of operation) 
 
Size 
 
 
Correlation 
Analysis 
 
Shapiro-
Wilk test 
 
 
 
 
 + 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 + 
 
 + 
 
 
 + 
Amene, T. B. (2017) 
 
 
Ethiopia 
Cross 
sectional  
2015 
 
Growth in sales 
 
Marketing cost 
reduction 
 
Bargaining power  
 
Carrying for 
others 
 
Members Value 
Factors 
Co-op 
governance 
factors 
Infrastructural 
factors 
Marketing 
factors 
Finance factors 
 
Correlation 
analysis 
 
Explorator
y  
 
Confirmato
ry factor 
analysis 
 
 
 +  
 
 +  
 
 
 +  
 
 +  
 
 +  
 
Mubigiri, A. (2016) 
 
Rwanda 
Cross 
sectional  
 
Cooperative 
economic growth  
 
Cooperative 
structure:  
managerial skills 
Correlation 
and 
Regression 
techniques  
 
 
 + 
 + 
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Author(s) year and 
region 
Nature of 
data and 
time span 
Regressand Regressor(s) Estimation 
technique 
Main 
Findings 
(date not 
specified) 
 training and skills 
 
Government support 
factors: 
Subsidies 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
Khan, H. H. A., 
Yaacob, M. A., 
Abdullah, H. and Ah, 
S. H. A. B. (2016) 
 
Malaysia 
Cross 
sectional 
 
2011 
Profit growth, 
Sales growth, 
ROA  
Return on sales 
Structural capital 
Relational 
Capital 
 
Human capital 
Correlation 
analysis 
 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
 + 
 
 + 
 
 - 
Khan, H. H. A., 
Yaacob, M. A., 
Abdullah, H. and Ah, 
S. H. A. B. (2016) 
 
Malaysia 
Cross 
sectional 
 
2011 
Profit growth, 
Sales growth, 
ROA  
Return on sales 
Structural capital 
Relational 
Capital 
 
Human capital 
Correlation 
analysis 
 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
 + 
 
 + 
 
 - 
Dejene, E. and 
Getachew, D. (2015) 
 
Ethiopia 
 
 
Cross 
sectional  
 
 
2013 
Service offering Member 
Commitment 
 
Member Participation 
 
 
Structural factors (no. 
of workers in a co-op) 
 
Communication 
 
Managerial factor 
(education) 
External factors 
Simple 
statistical 
tools: 
Percentage
s, mean 
and 
standard 
deviation 
 + 
 
 
 + 
 
 
 + 
 
 
 + 
 
 + 
 
 + 
Adefila, J.O. (2012) 
 
Cross 
sectional 
2011 
Role performance 
of the farmers’ 
Income Multiple 
regression  
 + 
 + 
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Author(s) year and 
region 
Nature of 
data and 
time span 
Regressand Regressor(s) Estimation 
technique 
Main 
Findings 
Nigeria cooperative 
organizations  
 
Number of years 
farming 
Number of 
people enrolled 
Assessment of 
leadership 
 
 + 
 
 + 
Azadi, H., Hosseininia, 
G., Zarafshani, K. 
Heydari, A. and 
Witlox, F. (2010) 
 
Iran 
Cross 
sectional 
 
2006 
Income 
maximisation  
 
Maximum 
participation    
 
Equity 
maximisation   
Individual factors: 
manager education 
 
Economic factors 
 
Structural factors: 
number of members 
in a co-op,  
 
years in operation 
ANOVA 
Spearman 
correlation 
Pearson 
correlation 
 + but no 
significan
t 
associatio
n 
 
 + but not 
significan
t 
 + but not 
significan
t 
Banaszak, I. (2008) 
 
Poland 
Cross 
sectional  
2005 
Benefits/costs 
Price Premium  
Number of group 
members 
Leadership strength 
Communication 
among members 
Member 
homogeneity 
 
 
Stepwise 
ordinal 
probit 
regression  
ANOVA 
 
 + 
 
  
Karami, E. and Rezaei-
Moghaddam, K. 
(2005) 
 
Iran 
Cross 
sectional  
 
Total performance 
index (TPI) 
Government support 
factors: loan 
 
Co-op structure 
factors: 
Manager education 
Membership size 
Age of co-op 
Hierarchica
l regression 
analysis  
 + 
 
 
 
 
 + (weak) 
 - 
 -  
 
